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Standard form contracts have been in use for over two centuries, 
and the question of the proper construction of these contracts has 
haunted contract law ever since. Form contracts were first used in the 
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latter half of the eighteenth century for marine insurance. I The insur-
ance companies' reliance on forms marked a radical departure from 
the traditional negotiated contract: 
No longer do individuals bargain for this or that provision in the 
COlli tract . . . . The control of the wording of those contracts has 
passed into the hands of the concern, and the drafting into the 
hands of its legal advisor .... In the trades affected it is henceforth 
futile for an individual to attempt any modification, and incorrect 
for the economist and lawyer to classify or judge such arrange-
ments as standing on an equal footing with individual agreements.2 
In the contemporary debate, some economists and lawyers con-
tinue to equate form contracts with the negotiated, "individual con-
tracts."'3 Other commentators, however, recognize that consumer 
form contracts create special risks and problems.4 These difficulties 
have been attributed, with varying emphases, to unequal bargaining 
power, to the failure to negotiate the contract terms, to the "take-it-
or-Ieavle-it" basis of the transaction, and to the fact that inevitably 
most t~!rms remain unread. S 
I. O'ITO PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN 
ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 11 (1937). This book was the subject of Karl Llewellyn's 
famous 1939 book review, in which he first detailed his own view of form contracts. See K.N. 
Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939); see infra text accompanying note 78. 
2. PRAUSNITZ, supra note 1, at 18 ("It is the freedom of contract theory pushed to its 
extreme, thus reaching its climax and resulting in fetters to one of the parties concerned. "). 
3. See. e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 84-86 (2d ed. 1977); 
Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 
1467 (1989); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of 
Imperfecl' Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 652-55 
(1979). This is not a unanimous view. For the theory that economic efficiency requires that 
the consumers' objective understanding control the unread written terms, see Michael I. 
Meyerson, The Efficient Form Contract: Law and Economics Meet the Real World, 24 GA. L. 
REV. 583 (1990); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice 
of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700 (1992). 
4. lbe term "consumer form contract" in this context includes more than merely 
contracts associated with the purchase of consumer goods and services. Many, though not all, 
form contracts create similar problems concerning informed assent. See. e.g., Martin v. Joseph 
Harris Co., Inc., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985) (small businesspeople such as family farmers); 
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971) (gas station franchisees); Matuszak 
v. Houston Oilers, 515 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) (contract presented to employees). 
Accordingly, any theory purporting to resolve the problems raised by form contracts must also 
cover agreements between employers and employees as well as between large and small 
business(:s, where the situation indicates to the reasonable contract drafter that the other party 
has not assented to unread and unexpected terms. See. e.g., Haspel v. Rollins Protective 
Service, Inc., 490 So. 2d 530, 533 (La. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 496 So. 2d 326 (La. 1986) 
(stating that "an artificial distinction between commercial enterprises and consumers is 
inappropriate ... Sophistication and educational level, not commerciality, are the primary 
considerations"). Cj. Addison Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576, 576 n.1 
(1969) (defining consumer as "a buyer of a small lot from a retailer"). 
5. See. e.g., infra text accompanying notes 23- 41. 
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Unfortunately, a generally accepted solution to the issue has yet 
to be formulated. In 1970, Arthur Letf described the law of consumer 
form contracts as "a disaster." He wrote "the consumer-purchase 
transaction is still stumbling about, a diagnosed disease seeking a nos-
trum."6 Since then, contract law has died,7 and been resurrected,8 
reconstructed,9 and transformed. lo Doctrines of adhesion, II reason-
able expectations,12 and unconscionabilityl3 have all been advanced. 
Yet, the battle continues to rage. 
This Article proposes a modest solution to the dilemma of form 
contracts. The Article's central thesis is that confusion continues to 
reign mostly because those seeking answers have searched too hard. 
The conceptual difficulties stem from one fundamental error: the 
common law presumption, often conclusive, that consumers who sign 
form contracts are aware of, understand, and assent to the unread, 
unexpected and uncontemplated terms in the form contracts. This 
presumption of assent conflicts with the objective theory of contracts. 
Because the drafters of these contracts know not only that their forms 
will not be read, but also that it is reasonable for consumers to sign 
them unstudied, a reasonable drafter should have no illusion that 
there has been true assent to these terms. If the common law courts 
had merely recognized the self-evident-that objectively the drafter 
does not expect the consumer to learn of the contract terms-tradi-
tional contract theory would have produced logical results. 
In short, courts correctly applying the objective theory to con-
sumer form contracts will not assume automatically that there is 
objective agreement to all terms merely because they have been 
printed and a document has been signed. Rather, courts will try to 
determine how a reasonable drafter should have understood the con-
sumer's agreement. The critical questions will be: 
6. Arthur A. Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 142 (1970). Thirteen years 
later one commentator stated that "[a]lthough there is a quite general perception that different 
law must be applied to contracts of adhesion, there is little agreement on what principles 
should control. The currently applicable law is characterized by a lack of intelligible doctrine 
and a lack of consistent results." Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts 0/ Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1983). 
7. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
8. Colin K. Kaufman, The Resurrection o/Contract, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 38 (1977). 
9. Rakoff, supra note 6, at 1176. 
10. W. David Slawson, The New Meaning 0/ Contract: The Trans/ormation 0/ Contracts 
Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21 (1984). 
II. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts 0/ Adhesion: Some Thoughts about Freedom 0/ Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). 
12. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: 
Part Two, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1970). 
13. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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1) What terms would a seller reasonably expect were known and 
undl~rstood by the non-drafting party? 
2) What subordinate terms were pointed out or explained by the 
selle:r? 
3) What would the reasonable seller have assumed was the con-
sumer's purpose in entering into the transaction? 
4) Is a clause favoring the drafter reasonably tailored to accom-
plish a legitimate purpose? 
5) Was information conveyed by the seller, either directly, by an 
agent or by advertisements, to create a reasonable expectation in 
the consumer? 
6) Did the consumer communicate to the seller information indi-
cating a particular understanding of the terms of the contract? 
7) Does an unknown one-sided clause deal with issues beyond the 
realm of contemplation of the reasonable consumer at the time of 
contracting? 
These questions focus attention on how a reasonable drafter 
should understand the assent of a consumer. This analysis does not 
automatically favor either the drafter or the consumer, but attempts 
to give both parties full freedom to contract together. It also may help 
bring the law of form contracts back into the mainstream of general 
contract law. 
II. THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 
In the ancient past, contracts required a "meeting of the minds" 
to be legally recognized. 14 It is now settled that no actual meeting of 
minds or subjective agreement is necessary, most obviously because 
the mind of a human is unknown and unknowable for the rest of the 
world. IS A person's true feelings are secret; the existence of heart-felt 
agreement is forever uncertain. 
A(;cordingly, the common law courts shifted their focus to a ver-
sion of "objective reality." The true motivations and feelings of the 
contrac:ting parties became irrelevant. 16 Instead, all that mattered 
was how words and actions would be understood by a reasonable 
14. E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 943-44 
(1967). 
15. See generally MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
1780-1860 200 (1977) (The subjective theory "had the drastic limitation of making legal 
certainty and predictability impossible. Once contractual obligation was founded entirely on 
an arbitrary 'meeting of minds,' it endowed the parties with a complete power to remake 
law."). 
16. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1920) ("In the formation 
of contrflcts it was long ago settled that secret intent was immaterial; only overt acts being 
considered in the determination of such mutual assent as that branch of law requires."). 
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recipient of information. As Judge Learned Hand stated: "A con-
tract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or indi-
vidual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by 
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, 
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent."!7 
To determine if A has made a legally enforceable promise to B, 
one must determine whether B "had reason to believe that the first 
party had that intention."!8 The intent of a speaker or writer is 
inferred from the perspective of what the listener or reader knew or 
should have known.!9 
Thus, if owners of property write and sign a piece of paper stat-
ing, "We hereby agree to sell to W.O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm com-
plete for $50,000, title satisfactory to buyer," a court can confidently 
find an intent to sell.20 Similarly, if Lucy reads and accepts the docu-
ment, the court may infer an intent to purchase the Ferguson Farm. 
This is a straightforward application of the rule that "[t]he law 
imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable 
meaning of his words and acts."2! 
Thus, traditionally there has been a so-called duty to read, which 
binds those who sign or accept a contract to the written terms even if 
they did not read or understand its content. 22 In cases involving 
negotiated contracts or experienced businesspeople, this duty to read 
is consistent with the objective theory because assent can reasonably 
be inferred from the act of signing a document in such circumstances. 
One expects the average businessperson to be able to learn the mean-
17. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 201 F.664 
(2nd Cir. 1912), affd, 231 U.S. 50 (1913). 
18. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 114 (1982). This rule governs transactions 
under the U.C.C. as well as the common law; see, e.g., City of Everett v. Estate of Sumstad, 
614 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), affd in part, rev'd in part, 631 P.2d 366 (Wash. 
1981). See generally U.C.C. § 1-103 ("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this 
Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law ... relative to capacity to contract, 
principle and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, 
or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions."); see also Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Sav. & Loan, 804 F.2d 1487, 1495 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Judges 
have a duty to consider the equities of a case unless equitable principles have been displaced, 
and nothing short of an express code provision ... demonstrates displacement.") (citations 
omitted). 
19. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 26 (3d ed. 
1987). 
20. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1954). 
21. [d. at 521 (quoting First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 192 S.E. 764, 770 
(Va. 1937». 
22. For a discussion of the evolution of the duty to read doctrine, see John D. Calamari, 
Duty to Read: A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974). 
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ing of the contract terms with relative ease and to voice any disagree-
ment with such terms. 
There are, however, circumstances where the significance of the 
same at;t is quite different. The law has long recognized that unsus-
pecting recipients of parcel room checks or ticket stubs do not accept, 
and thus are not bound by, the printed limitations on liability.23 This 
principle, too, is consistent with the objective theory because the party 
printing the ticket, knowing the fine print will not be read, does not 
have a reasonable belief that the other party assented to the limita-
tions. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated in 
rejecting a waiver of liability printed on the ticket to an amusement 
park attraction: "[A] person of average intelligence and alertness 
would be unlikely to observe it, and would enter the [ride] in the belief 
that he: had all the rights of the ordinary business visitor with respect 
to so much of the premises as he was invited to use."24 The court 
added that if such a limitation was to be enforceable at all, the ride's 
propri(!tor should have "employed adequate means to bring to [the 
patron's] attention the fact that his invitation was a qualified and con-
ditiona.l one."2S 
If the objective theory of contracts were correctly applied to con-
sumer form contracts, a similar rule would result. In our current 
society, the average consumer is unlikely to observe most of the terms 
in form contracts. They may well know central terms, such as price 
and quantity, but generally they neither know nor understand 
subordinate terms, such as those describing recourse in case of 
breach.26 Consumers, thus, contract with a reasonable belief that they 
do not relinquish the rights implied by law for the benefit of the ordi-
nary contracting party.27 
23. See generally Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 217 P. 673 (Mont. 1923) (railroad 
ticket); Healy v. N.Y.Cent. & H.R.R., Co., 138 N.Y. Supp. 287 (N.Y. 1912) (parcel room 
claim check); Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 325 N.Y. Supp. 2d. 576 (N.Y.C. Ct. 1971) 
(80-pagt: auction house catalogue); McAshan v. Cavitt, 299 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. 1950) (parking 
lot claim check). 
24. Kushner v. McGinnis, 194 N.E. 106, 108 (Mass. 1935). 
25. [d. 
26. For a discussion of the differentiation between "central" and "subordinate" terms, see 
George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1304-06 
(1981). This differentiation is analogous to Llewellyn's distinction between a "few dickered 
terms" and "boilerplate clauses." See infra text accompanying note 85. 
27. This view is in harmony with the presumption that a party to a contract will not 
knowin,~ly give an unfair advantage to the other without receiving adequate compensation, 
which :is another method of establishing a party's objective intent. See. e.g., Brown v. 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 269 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), motion granted, 228 
N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1967), affd, 231 N.E.2d 768 (N.Y. 1967) ("It is not to be assumed that 
people act unreasonably to their own disadvantage ... "); Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 
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It is no secret that consumers neither read nor understand stan-
dard form contracts.28 The president of a car rental company hardly 
believes that renters at the airport rental counter read the front and 
back of the rental contract before receiving the keys.29 It is equally 
unrealistic to state that a reasonable rental car executive would 
assume that a renter's signature reflects true assent to every term in 
the contract. 30 The only basis for such a belief would be if the current 
law mandates such a result despite the objective understanding of the 
rental car executive.3 ! Any expectation that the contract terms writ-
ten by the company's lawyers are enforceable against the consumer is 
"reasonable" not because the consumer's true intent was objectively 
ascertained but solely because of the legal rule. 
One reason for a contract system founded on objective criteria of 
assent to ignore the reasonable interpretation of the consumer's intent 
might be to affect the consumer's behavior. However, consumers do 
889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) ("There will be no assumption of a purpose to visit venial 
faults with oppressive retribution. "). 
28. See. e.g., Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985,992 (Colo. 1986) (automobile rental 
agent testifying that she had never seen any customer read the reverse side of the rental 
agreement); Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967) ("The ordinary consumer goods 
purchaser more often than not does not read the fine print .... "); Holiday of Plainview, Ltd. 
v. Bernstein, 350 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1973) (stating that "it is true that 
defendant (as have many before him and probably many will after him) failed to read the entire 
contract"). 
29. See. e.g .• Elliot Lease Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977) (stating that 
"[i]t is common knowledge, and so should have been known to [the car leasing company] that 
the detailed provisions of insurance contracts are seldom read by consumers"); see also Val 
Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987) (finding that average consumer 
would not understand the numerous exceptions to the limitation on liability for damage to the 
rental car). 
30. When the context of the transaction "is such as to preclude the reasonable expectation 
that the printing will be read or understood in any significant number of cases, the seller 
cannot claim that he nonetheless so expected. He therefore has no basis of asserting that he 
relied to his detriment on manifestations of mutual consent." W. David Slawson, Standard 
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 544 
(1971). 
31. "A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does not 
ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the standard terms." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979). The principal drafter of this 
section of the Restatement (Second) argued that "Customers who adhere to standardized 
contractual terms ordinarily, 'understand that they are assenting to the terms not read or not 
understood, subject to such limitations as the law may impose.''' Carpenter v. Suffolk 
Franklin Sav. Bank, 346 N.E.2d 892, 900 (Mass. 1976) (Braucher, J.) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) § 237 cmt. b (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7 (1973». This statement is unhelpful for two 
reasons. First, it is not at all clear that consumers "understand" that they are signing away 
substantive rights or procedural rights. Second, the term "subject to such limitations as the 
law may impose" is too broad, thus permitting "the law" to construe form contracts according 
to either the non-drafter's reasonable expectations or an objective interpretation of the non-
drafter'S intent. 
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not read form contracts both because it is unreasonable to do so and 
because businesses do not want consumers to read them prior to 
signing. 32 
Most consumers fail to read the form contracts that pass before 
them every day.33 Consumers simply do not have the time to read 
them, as exemplified by the car-renter at the airport. They also gener-
ally laek the legal background to understand the subordinate 
clauses. 34 Additionally, because consume know that the agent behind 
the cou:nter is not authorized to rewrite the contract,35 they conclude 
that there is little to be gained from reading a non-negotiable contract. 
Moreover, businesses hardly want the consumer to read form 
contracts. If the purpose of using a form is to achieve uniformity in 
transaction, individualized negotiations will defeat that purpose. 36 
Additionally, businesses, like consumers, are short of time and prefer 
not to have their turnover slowed by hordes of consumers pausing to 
peruse pages of legalese. 37 
Dc!spite wishful commentary to the contrary,38 there is no evi-
32. F'lr an economic analysis of why it is inefficient for consumers to read form contracts, 
see MeyeJ:son, supra note 3, at 596-603. 
33. The rationality of not reading the form contract is strengthened by the increased 
difficulty resulting from the use of excessively fine print and hopelessly convoluted language. 
"[C]ontra.cts of adhesion, most of which are editorial nightmares, proliferate. There is a dark 
suspicion that the same people who prepare these prepare tax forms and directions as to how 
to put together packaged Christmas toys." Spence v. Omnibus Indus., 119 CaI.Rptr. 171, 173 
n.l (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
34. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 8, at 45 ("Knowledge that certain words were used 
creates no knowledge of the reality intended to be created."); see also Commercial Union 
Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 394 A.2d 839, 841 (N.H. 1978) ("Although insurers have had over 
one hundred years to hone their policies into forms that would not ferry the unwary reader on 
a trip int[) Wonderland, they regrettably often fully merit the criticism that Chief Justice Doe 
[deploring the prolixity of complex verbiage in policies, DeLancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 
581 (187])] levelled at their predecessors.") (quoting Storms v. United States Fidelity & Guar. 
Co., 388 A.2d 578,580 (N.H. 1978»; Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (N.J. 1967) ("[I]t is 
unlikely that [the consumer] would understand the legal jargon, and the significance of the 
clauses in not explained to him. "). 
35. "Employees regularly using a form often have only a limited understanding of its 
terms and limited authority to vary them." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 211 
cmt. b (1979). See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 125 n.13 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1982) (in response to the question whether there is negotiation over form terms, a 
salespenon stated: "I'm not empowered to do that, sir."). 
36. "One of the purposes of standardization is to eliminate bargaining over details of 
individuill transactions, and that purpose would not be served if a substantial number of 
customers retained counsel and reviewed the standard terms." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRAcrs § 211 cmt. b (1979). See also M.J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of 
Bargaining Power: Post Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. Toronto L.J. 359, 
364 (1976) (stating that consumer standard form contracts are used "to reduce transaction 
costs"). 
37. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 8, at 40-41. 
38. Priest, supra note 26, at 1347. 
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dence that a small cadre of type-A consumers ferrets out the most 
beneficial subordinate contract terms, permitting the market to pro-
tect the vast majority of consumers. Obvious terms, such as pricing 
and warranties, may be subject to such comparison shopping. It is 
hard, however, to imagine a sufficient number of prospective consum-
ers refusing to rent a car because the contract contains an unfair 
forum selection clause. 39 
If consumers do not read and comprehend the subordinate terms 
of standard form contracts, there can be no subjective agreement to 
the particular terms. Furthermore, merchants and sellers who know 
that consumers do not read these terms have no objective basis for 
claiming that the consumers agreed to those terms. If it is both unrea-
sonable and undesirable to have consumers read these terms, courts 
should not fashion legal rules in a futile attempt to force consumers to 
read these terms or to punish those who do not.40 
The common law of contracts, it seems, has strayed for the path 
of logical progression.41 The wrong turn occured when the perfectly 
logical assumption that a merchant's signature implied assent to nego-
tiated terms was mistakenly applied to consumer form contracts. The 
courts abandoned the objective theory in search of a seductive 
consistency. 
III. CLASSIC CONTRACTS 
The classical legal view of standard form contracts defies logic 
and invites great injustice. Essentially, under the twin banners of 
39. It is similarly ridiculous to believe that advertising permits competitors to inform 
consumers of unexpected harsh secondary terms. See Ware, supra note 3, at 1479. As one 
commentator noted, "it would be ludicrous for a seller to base an advertising campaign on the 
claim that, 'if you injure yourself on our cruise, you can sue us anywhere.'" Goldman, supra 
note 3, at 719. 
40. Courts attempting to force consumers to read form contracts know that they will not 
succeed. This futility was recognized by the Nevada Supreme Court in Farmers Ins. Exch. v. 
Young, 832 P.2d 376, 379 n.2 (Nev. 1992). "Although we understand that many people may 
in fact not read their insurance policies, we conclude that the consumer has at least this 
responsibility. If we presume that consumers do not read policies, we would then force 
insurers to explain verbally every minute detail of a policy. We must assume that the insured 
party has at least read the policy and given a plain common-sense meaning to the policy's 
provisions." This is not a sound basis for a decision. Courts should not presume something 
they know is untrue. Besides, insurers need not explain "every minute detail," only 
unexpected terms or those which contradict the rest of the policy. See infra note 289 and 
accompanying text. 
41. See generally POSNER, supra note 3, at 404-07. 
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"freedom of contract"42 and "duty to read,"43 the law has given draft-
ers of form contracts the power to impose their will on unsuspecting 
and vulnerable individuals. 
The 1918 case of Morstad v. Atchinson T. & s,F. Railway Co. 44 
demonstrates the resulting hardship and injustice. A railroad worker, 
Andrew Morstad, was injured while unloading timber. He was taken 
to a bunk car and was lying on a bed "in an awful pain."4s The rail-
road company foreman presented him with a form and said, "[H]ere 
is somelthing you will have to sign before you go to the hospital. "46 
Morstad, who was not wearing his reading glasses, signed the form 
without reading it. The form was a settlement contract whereby Mor-
stad "agreed" to release the railroad from all liability in exchange for 
one dollar and transportation to the hospita1.47 
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the validity of the 
release, stating that "[Morstad] was guilty of such gross negligence in 
not in£:>rming himself of the contents of the contract that he is 
estopped to avoid the same. His lack of knowledge of the contents of 
the contract was due absolutely to his own negligence. "48 The court 
opined that "it is the duty of every person to read a contract before he 
signs the same, if he can read, and it is as much his duty to have the 
same rt~ad and explained to him before he executes it, if he cannot 
read or understand it. "49 
The court gave several policy rationales for this strict rule. 
Someone who signs a contract "owes it to the other party to read or 
have re:ad, the contract ... because the other party has a right to and 
does conform his own conduct to the requirements of the con-
tract ... . "50 The court also noted that permitting Morstad to go 
beyondl the written word would threaten to "destroy all of the efficacy 
42. See, e.g., Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 221 S.E.2d 449, 504-05 
(N.C. 1976) (upholding disclaimer of liability for negligent handling of yellow page advertising 
because l:ach person is "free to contract according to [his] own judgment"); contra College 
Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc. v. Hoffmann, 241 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Wis. 1976) (stating that 
"[t]he unconsidered application of the principle of freedom of contract ... is not always 
justified when there are extenuating circumstances which may affect the degree to which that 
freedom actually exists"). 
43. See, e.g., Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 303 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating 
that warranty disclaimer in tenth paragraph of twenty-one paragraphs on back of two-page 
contract "should have attracted the attention of a reasonable buyer"). 
44. :170 P. 886 (N.M. 1918). 
45. ld. at 889. 
46.1d. 
47. Jd. at 890. 
48 . .rd. 
49 . .rd. at 889. 
50 . .rd. 
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of written contracts."S! The rule, the court noted in conclusion, "ren-
ders written contracts safe and secure, and just what they must be if 
the business of the world is to be carried on in an orderly fashion. "52 
Classical courts upheld written language, even where the drafter 
discouraged a semi-literate individual from reading the paper by say-
ing, "it was all a matter of form-it was immaterial."s3 Judges confi-
dently cited, "the well-settled principle that affixing a signature to a 
contract creates a conclusive presumption, except as against fraud, 
that the signer read, understood, and assented to its terms."S4 Courts 
moralistically preached that if a person failed to read the contract, 
"he cannot set up his own carelessness and indolence as a defense."ss 
This classical theory has no basis in either reality or justice. S6 
Courts had to create a "conclusive" presumption that the signing 
party understood the terms because such a presumption was so 
counter-factual. The drafters of the contracts knew the signing party 
had not read the terms. There could be no problem of unfair surprise, 
since the objective understanding of the contract drafter mirrored the 
SUbjective reality of the non-drafter. 
The other problem with the classical theory was that it permitted 
drafters of form contracts to abuse their power.S7 There were no safe-
guards against grotesquely one-sided agreements, drafted to be signed 
unread. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. The court gave Morstad the opportunity to prove that he received no 
consideration for the release. [d. at 890. 
53. Fivey v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 52 A. 472, 474 (N.J. 1902). 
54. [d. at 473 (emphasis added). 
55. McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 100 P. 524, 526 (Okla. 1909). 
56. "It is obvious that analysis of the form lease in terms of traditional contract principles 
will not suffice, for those rules were developed for negotiated transactions which embody the 
intention of both parties." Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. 1966). 
57. See, e.g., Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (calling 
form term "a snare and deceit"); Spring Valley Gardens Ass'n v. Earle, 447 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 
(N.Y. County Ct. 1982) ("[I]t is immediately apparent that [these leases] have been carefully, 
painstakingly designed to provide maximum protection for the landlords and to give only the 
most grudging, minimal recognition to the reasonable expectations of residential tenants."). 
For a particularly angry judicial response to one such incident, see John Deere Leasing Co. v. 
Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1571 (D. Kan. 1986), where the court described a form lease 
term imposing a penalty for defaulting as: 
written in such fine, light print as to be nearly illegible .... The court was ... 
required to use a magnifying glass to read the reverse side. The court found the 
wording to be unreasonably complex. It is as if the scrivener intended to conceal 
the thrust of the agreement in the convoluted language and fine print .... John 
Deere's contention that the defendant had a duty to ascertain the meaning of all 
terms, in the face of the near concealment of this unusually harsh remedy, is 
inexcusably inadequate and need not be tolerated by any court. This court is 
surprised that a reputable company such as Deere would stoop to this. 
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In response to this problem, judges began resorting to subterfuge 
to reach the result that should have been obtained directly under basic 
principles of "objective appearances." Ambiguity, waiver, estoppel, 
and conditions to contract were used to sidestep unpleasant results, 
while Khe courts purportedly followed the path of the earlier 
decisions. 58 
Many of the finest legal scholars of the twentieth century have 
tried with limited success to correct these errors, each pointing out 
the inconsistency in legal reasoning and illustrating a part of the prob-
lem. More recently, serious attempts have been made to present a 
formal solution to the entire area by creating a separate rule for form 
contrac:ts. 59 The collective wisdom has brought us to the point where 
contrac:t law can now be reunified, where the objective theory of con-
tracts is again applied to all contracts. 
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF FORM CONTRACT THEORY 
The first step in the creation of a unified theory of form contracts 
was the basic recognition that form contracts are fundamentally dif-
ferent from the classic individualized contracts that existed during the 
formation of the common law. In 1919, Edwin Patterson imported 
the phrase "contracts of adhesion" into American jurisprudence.60 
Pattemon's translation of a French writer's analysis focused on the 
lack of bargaining associated with these contracts. 
Doubtless, there are contracts and contracts, and we are in reality 
far from the unity of contractual type assumed by the law. Eventu-
arty the law must, indeed, yield to the shading and differences that 
have emerged from social relations. There are pretended contracts 
that have only the name, the juridical construction of which 
remains to be made. For these, in any event, the rules of individual 
interpretation should undergo important modifications, if only that 
one might call them, for lack of a better term, contracts of adhe-
sion, those in which a single will is exclusively predominant, acting 
aH a unilateral will which dictates its law, no longer to an individ-
58. See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 702 ("[W]e have developed a whole series of semi-
covert techniques for somewhat balancing these bargains."); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law 
Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 972 ("The conclusion is 
inescapable that courts have sometimes invented ambiguity where none existed, then resolving 
the inv,~nted ambiguity contrary to the plainly expressed terms of the contract document."); 
see also Marston v. American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035, 1039 (1st Cir. 1971) ("Not 
infrequently the linkage between results and rational analysis has been blurred to the point of 
invisibility. "). 
59. See infra text accompanying notes 189-90. 
60. Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery ofa Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 
222 (1919). 
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ual, but to an indeterminate collectivity, and which in advance 
undertakes unilaterally, subject to the adhesion of those who would 
wish to accept the law [loil of the contract and to take advantage of 
the engagements imposed on themselves.61 
1275 
In 1943, Friedrich Kessler presented the first full portrait of con-
tracts of adhesion.62 He saw several key components: 1) "form con-
tracts" were typically used by businesses with a "strong bargaining 
power;" 2) the drafter either enjoyed a monopolistic position or used 
the same contract as its competitors; 3) the weaker party understood 
the legal consequences ofthe contract, "only in a vague way, if at all;" 
and 4) the terms of the contract were presented on a take-it-or-Ieave-it 
basis.63 
Kessler argued these contracts were inconsistent with traditional 
notions of freedom of contract which have "delegated to individual 
citizens a piece of sovereignty which enables them to participate con-
stantly in the law making process."64 Without prescribing a particu-
lar legal treatment for form contracts,65 Kessler complained that "our 
common law of standardized contracts is highly contradictory and 
confusing. "66 
The same year Kessler's article was published, William Prosser 
wrote an article discussing an important SUbtopic, disclaimers of the 
implied warranty of merchantability. 67 Although neglected by most 
studies of form contracts, Prosser's analysis offers a compelling under-
standing that is applicable to the entire field. 
Prosser noted that a "disclaimer is not at all a pernicious thing in 
any case where it appears that the buyer really is willing to take his 
chances." 68 Thus, it is proper to enforce a contractual disclaimer 
when a buyer purchases second-hand goods or when the seller lacks 
61. RAYMOND SALEILLES, DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLONTE § 89 at 229-30 (1901) 
(translated in Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 833, 856 (1964». The first case to rely on the terminology of "adhesion" was 
an insurance case, Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (N.D. 1940). 
62. Kessler, supra note 11, at 632. 
63. Id. The California Supreme Court has defined an adhesion contract as "a contract 
entered into between two parties of unequal strength, expressed in the language of a 
standardized contract, written by the more powerful bargainer to meet its own needs, and 
offered to the weaker party on a 'take it or leave it basis' "). Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 
168, 171 (Cal. 1966). 
64. Kessler, supra note II, at 641. 
65. See W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of 
Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 32 (1984). 
66. Kessler, supra note II, at 633. 
67. William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. 
REV. 117 (1943). 
68. Id. at 159. 
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knowledge of the quality of the goods and "makes it clear" that the 
sale is c:onditioned on the seller bearing no responsibility for their 
quality.li9 In other words, risks may properly be shifted to consumers, 
provided they knowingly accept them. 
However, Prosser warned, when courts mechanically uphold a 
seller's contract disclaiming all warranties, "a dangerous power is 
placed in the hands of the seller."70 Prosser argued the seller cannot 
reasonably suppose that a buyer "is willing to pay good money for 
whatevt::r the seller will give him, and remain completely at the seller's 
mercy."71 The seller knows that the typical buyer expects a particular 
item to be of generally acceptable quality. Even the most comprehen-
sive disdaimer is contradicted by the contractual description of the 
goods being sold; their very name incorporates the general under-
standing that they are "goods of the kind sold on the market.'072 
Prosser proposed to limit the effectiveness of disclaimers of 
implied warranties to those instances where purchasers could be 
understood to have actually agreed to a disclaimer. Disclaimers 
would be ineffective whenever "the circumstances indicate that a rea-
sonable person in the position of the buyer would, despite such gen-
eral language, be in fact relying on the merchantable quality of the 
goods or their fitness for a particular purpose. '073 
One year after Prosser's article appeared, Arthur Corbin put 
another small piece of the form contract puzzle into place when he 
wrote his famous review of the parol evidence rule.74 Corbin argued 
that the written words of a contract should not be interpreted to con-
flict with the contracting parties' intent. He urged judges to look 
behind the writing to ascertain the parties' desires from all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the contract. Corbin declared that merger 
clauses, express written contractual declarations that there are no 
unwritten promises, should not be reflexively enforced. Corbin stated 
that such clauses are properly understood as assertions of fact rather 
than conclusions of law. He added, "paper and ink possess no magic 
power to cause statements of fact to be true when they are actually 
untrue. "75 Therefore, the writing could not be conclusive because 
69.Id. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
72. Id. at 160. 
73. /d. at 165 (quoting the SECOND DRAFT OF THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 
§ 15(6) (1941». Prosser's support for the phrase "general language" is probably meant to be 
viewed the same as his earlier statement that "[a]ny general language of the disclaimer, no 
matter how comprehensive it may be [qualifies)." Id. at 160. 
74. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603 (1944). 
75. JrJ. at 620. 
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"[a] statement in the writing that it contains all terms agreed upon 
and that there are no promises, warranties, or other extrinsic provi-
sions, is a statement of fact that may actually be untrue. "76 Though 
the contractual language may be clear, courts should permit addi-
tional oral promises to be proven "where justice seems to require it."77 
Despite the work of Prosser and Corbin, it was Karl Llewellyn 
who dominated the early analysis of standard form contracts. His 
writings, published from 1939 through 1960, continue to serve as the 
starting point for the current debate on this topic. 
Llewellyn noted that form contracts replaced "item by item" 
negotiation with "standard clauses and terms, prepared often by one 
of the parties only. "78 This could be a positive development, he 
stated, because standardized contracts saved time and money.79 The 
danger of the forms, however, was from the potential for abuse cre-
ated by the one-sided control over contract terms. To prevent that 
harm, Llewellyn complained, courts used subterfuges, such as finding 
ambiguity where none existed or placing strained interpretations on 
clear language, to protect the non-drafting party. Llewellyn criticized 
this approach as ultimately ineffective, since it permitted skillful con-
tract writers simply to draft new language to accomplish the same 
unfairness. Second, mangling legal rules limited the efficacy of the 
rules in other areas of contract law without guaranteeing just results 
for form contracts. Llewellyn cogently stated, "Covert tools are never 
reliable tools. "80 
Llewellyn'S first attempt to clarify the law resulted in the follow-
ing syllogism: 
[F]ree contract presupposes free bargain; and ... free bargain pre-
supposes free bargaining; and that where bargaining is absent in 
fact, the conditions and clauses to be read into a bargain are not 
those which happen to be printed on the unread paper, but are 
those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that 
paper.8\ 
This statement reads like a formulation of the modem doctrine 
of reasonable expectations.82 It is not the words on the page that con-
76. [d. at 621. 
77. /d. at 643. 
78. LJeweJlyn, supra note I, at 700. 
79. [d. at 701. "Nothing can approach in speed and sanity of readaptation the machinery 
of standard forms of a trade and for a line of trade, built to meet the particular needs of that 
trade." 
SO. [d. at 703. 
SI. [d. at 704. 
S2. See infra text accompanying notes 210-13. 
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trol, but the terms one would "reasonably expect" to find on the page. 
Nonetheless, Llewellyn gave a great deal of deference to the 
drafter. Under Llewellyn's analysis, "utterly unreasonable clauses" 
would be struck down, but "a due presumption in favor of an expert's 
knowledge of what the condition of his trade may be calling for" 
would still be permitted. 83 
Ll<!wellyn struck a similar balance in his last major discussion of 
form contracts in 1960.84 He propounded his "answer" to the ques-
tion pmed by form contracts: 
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can 
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at 
all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few 
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one 
thing more. That one thing is a blanket assent (not a specific 
ass1ent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may 
have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable 
meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which has not been 
read has no business to cut under the reasonable meaning of those 
dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real 
expression of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs in.8s 
Llewellyn continued to believe that tradespeople knew which 
clauses were most appropriate and that forms were efficient and desir-
able. He added that courts reviewing form terms should remember 
that "there are still many which are sound particularizations of the 
deal to the business, very useful and wholly within reason; and those 
ought to be sustained and applied."86 
Perhaps the most vigorous attack on Llewellyn'S respect for non-
negotiated terms came from Todd Rakoff, who argued that Llewellyn 
had "failed to understand that it is very often the lawyer's expertise, 
not the businessman's, that is revealed."87 Rakoff asserted the goal of 
contract drafters was not to further the interest of the trade, but to 
protect their client's interests as best possible. Thus, he proposed that 
subordinate contract terms, which he called "invisible terms," be pre-
sumed unenforceable. 88 
Colin Kaufman countered that it was judges who should not be 
overly trusted in determining the content of form contracts. 89 He 
83. Llewellyn, supra note I, at 704. 
84. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING ApPEALS 
(1960). 
85. [d. at 370. 
86. [d. at 366. 
87. RakoW, supra note 6, at 1205. 
88. [d. at 1220-48. 
89. COLIN K. KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1992 Supp.). 
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feared that Rakofrs approach would result in a change from "an 
even-handed rule to a consumers only doctrine."9o Kaufman con-
tended that form contracts, growing out of business experience and 
expertise, serve a valid purpose. The role of the courts, he concluded, 
is to ensure the fairness of form terms: the contract is presumed fair, 
but the non-drafting party can defeat it by proving either that the 
drafter has received all the benefits of the terms or that the terms are 
not reasonably adapted to advance legitimate purposes.91 In sum, 
Kaufman argued, "[t]he loss of 'freedom of contract' suffered by the 
customer in modem society does not require as a corollary that busi-
nesses must lose that same freedom, but only that they exercise that 
freedom in a fair manner. "92 
An alternate tack was suggested by both Arthur LeW3 and David 
Slawson.94 They each saw the problems of form contracts as a public 
law concern. Skeptical about the expertise of courts, each urged legis-
lative and administrative control of the content of form contracts. 95 
In a subsequent article, Slawson argued such outside intervention 
might not be necessary if courts continued to adopt what he termed, 
"the new meaning of contract."96 Under this approach, courts are 
not limited to the mere interpretation of contractual language. They 
are to find the contractual obligations imposed by form contracts 
based on all the circumstances.97 The writing no longer controls. 
Instead, "under the new meaning [of contracts], the reasonable expec-
tations are the contract. "98 
One final player in the academic debate was Robert Keeton, 
whose analysis of insurance contracts helped spawn the "doctrine of 
reasonable expectations. "99 Even though his analysis focused on 
insurance contracts, the reasoning and principles generally apply to 
consumer form contracts. 100 
90. [d. at 368-89. 
91. [d. at 358-67. 
92. Colin K. Kaufman, The Resurrection of Contract, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 38,71 (1977). 
93. Leff, supra note 6, at 147-57. 
94. Slawson, supra note 30, at 557-61. See also W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: 
Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (1974). 
95. Leff, supra note 6, at 147-57; Slawson, supra note 30, at 533-36. 
96. Slawson, supra note 10, at 71-74. 
97. [d. at 23. 
98. [d. 
99. Keeton, supra note 58, at 966-74. 
100. Since neither type of form contract is read by the typical consumer and neither results 
from negotiation but is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by a drafter with greater 
bargaining power, the literal language on each printed page often will not reflect the objective 
understanding of the contract. See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 10, at 52 (asserting that the 
reasonable expectations doctrine "lacks any principled justification for being limited to 
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Judge Learned Hand had espoused an earlier version of the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations. He wrote that the common layper-
son's understanding of insurance terms, not the special industry 
meaning, should govern policy interpretation. 101 The content of the 
actual language used, however, firmly anchored this rule so that 
unambiguous language still controlled: "A man must indeed read 
what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek 
to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance 
intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting 
confusion. " 102 
In 1970, Keeton reviewed many insurance cases relying on the 
insured's reasonable expectations, and he enunciated a new version of 
this principle: "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants 
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts 
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provi-
sions would have negated those expectations."103 The use of the 
phrase "painstaking study" illustrates the lineage of the principle. 
Without mandating that policyholders "read what they sign," Keeton 
insurance policies"); see also Gray v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 17 (D.C.Cir. 1984) 
(applying rules of construction for insurance contracts to ordinary contract); Davis v. M.L.G. 
Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 989 n.4 (Colo. 1986) (stating that because car rental "was, like most 
insurance contracts, a 'form' contract prepared by the lessor and offered on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis ... 'we feel that the appropriate interpretive principles are those normally applicable to 
insurance contracts.' ") (quoting Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (R.I. 
1977»; Uni-Serv Corp. v. Frede, 271 N.Y.S.2d 478, 483 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1966), affd, 279 
N.Y.S.2d 510 (N.Y. App. Term 1967) ("The rules for construction of ordinary contracts do 
not differ from those to be applied to insurance contracts .... In this case, the [credit card] 
contract was not negotiated and [was] exclusively prepared by plaintiff, so that rules for 
construction of insurance contracts are applicable. "); Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty 
Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 806 n.17 (Utah 1992) (finding it "difficult to conceive why the version 
of the reasonable expectations doctrine ... should be limited solely to insurance contracts"). 
Insurance contracts do contain some common features, such as a right of cancellation. See 
William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking A Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. 
REV. 267, 271-72 (1986). Also, insurance contracts are not received until after they have been 
made. Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 339-
41 (1986). Nevertheless, these features are either not determinative of the objective 
understanding of consumers or are not unique to insurance contracts. See. e.g., Carnival 
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (where cruise line did not send contract until ticket 
paid). 
101. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
331 U.S. 849 (1947) ("An underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its 
context, but the application was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go to persons 
utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance, who would read it colloquially. It is 
the understanding of such persons that counts .... "). 
102. Gaunt, 160 F.2d at 602. 
103. Keeton, supra note 58, at 967. The first case to adopt explicitly a formulation similar 
to Professor Keeton's was Smith v. Westland Life. Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 441 (Cal. 1975). 
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implies that an unread contract containing an unexpected clause is 
binding if a "casual reading" would have indicated its meaning. 
In fact, one of the greatest sources of confusion over the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations is whether court should indeed use it only 
for contracts that are ambiguous or also for all unread language. I04 If 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations is limited to ambiguous con-
tracts, it is not a doctrine at all; it is nothing more than the traditional 
rule that ambiguous contracts be interpreted against the drafter. \Os 
Only if courts discard the fiction that consumers read form language, 
unambiguous or otherwise, will contracting parties realize their rea-
sonable expectations. 
The other major stumbling block for courts considering the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations is the fear that consumers will invent 
expectations post hoc to receive a gain not bargained for. Rejecting 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the Idaho Supreme Court 
warned that "the periphery of what losses would be covered could be 
extended by an insured's affidavit of what he 'reasonably expected' to 
be covered."106 
104. One commentator noted three separate responses: restricting the theory to ambiguous 
contracts only, utilizing the theory to determine whether a contract's "fine print" unfairly 
limits a party's more prominent expectations, and looking at all the circumstances to 
determine reasonable expectations. Ware, supra note 3, at 1467. Other commentators have 
noted only two dominant themes. See, e.g., Rahdert, supra note 100, at 335-36,345 (analyzing 
weaker and stronger versions). There is an ongoing judicial debate concerning the subject. 
Compare Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979) (enforcing 
unambiguous insurance terms); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 
469 A.2d 563 (pa. 1983) (same) with Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales & Serv., 828 P.2d 162 (Alaska 
1991) (no ambiguity needed); Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 282-83 
(Ariz. 1987) (same). A Missouri appellate court has criticized its Supreme Court for requiring 
ambiguity. Compare Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. 
1991) ("The 'reasonable expectations doctrine' requires that there be a contract of adhesion 
and ambiguity in the policy language") with Cobb ex rei. Lambert v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 820 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Mo. App. 1991) (stating that requiring an ambiguity before 
applying the doctrine of reasonable expectations is "inconsistent with the definition of the 
doctrine as it applies even when 'a thorough study of the policy provisions would have negated 
these expectations.''') (quoting Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp. Serv., Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 
(Mo. 1982». See generally Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in 
Insurance Law after Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990); Mayhew, supra note 100, at 
278-86. 
105. See National Bank v. Insurance Co., 95 U.S. 673, 679 (1877) ("It is its [the insurance 
company's] language which the court is invited to interpret, and it is both reasonable and just 
that its own words should be construed most strongly against [it]."); see also Ware, supra note 
3, at 1469 (stating that because all courts interpret ambiguities against the drafter, limiting 
reasonable expectations to ambiguous contracts effectively means there is no new doctrine). 
106. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Idaho 1979); see also San Francisco 
Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (stating 
that "failing to read the contract is no excuse, otherwise all contracts of adhesion would be 
unenforceable at the whim of the adhering party"). 
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This concern is unwarranted and confuses objective with subjec-
tive expectations. The very concept of reasonable expectations 
imposes a requirement that the expectation have an objective founda-
tion. The consumer must still show "some evidentiary basis beyond 
naked belief on the part of the person seeking coverage, i.e., that it be 
objectively determinable. "107 
Perhaps the real reason for the judicial reluctance to embrace the 
full doctrine of reasonable expectations is the fear of creating broad 
new exceptions to normal contract principles for a wide range of con-
sumer transactions. lOB For example, when the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the doctrine of reasonable expectations, it emphasized its con-
cern with any "attempt to craft a new and potentially sweeping equi-
table doctrine."l09 
We need no new and sweeping doctrine for interpreting con-
sumer form contracts. Properly applied, the venerable objective the-
ory will achieve the goals of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, 
without grafting a new branch onto the jurisprudential tree. 1 10 
V. ROADS NOT TAKEN: THE U.C.C. AND THE 
SECOND RESTATEMENT 
Twice has a solution to the dilemma of form contracts been close 
at hand. The drafters of both the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts presented for 
consideration workable proposals consistent with the objective theory 
of contracts. It is no small irony that the champions of these propos-
als were two of the leading figures in twentieth century contract law, 
107. Henderson, supra note 104, at 839. 
108. Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798,806 (Utah 1992). The 
court describes its decision as one "to proceed interstitially with existing equitable doctrines 
rather than to adopt a new doctrine with unknown ramifications." Id. at 806; see also 
Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 N.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Mass. 1981) (declining without 
explaination to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations and stating "[w]e are not 
prepared to make this the first case in which this court adopts such an approach to the 
purchase of insurance."). 
109. Allen, 839 P.2d at 806. Later in the opinion, the court describes its decision as one "to 
proceed interstitially with existing equitable doctrines rather than to adopt a new doctrine with 
unknown ramifications .... " Id. at 806. See also Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 424 
N.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Mass. 1971) (declining to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
because, without further explanation, "[w]e are not prepared to make this the first case in 
which this court adopts such an approach to the purchase of insurance."). 
110. Arguably, the Utah Supreme Court is, in fact, utilizing an objective theory. The court 
saw no reason not to use "estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, breach of the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, and the rule that ambiguous language is to be resolved against the 
drafter ... to protect against overreaching insurers ... on a case-by case basis." Allen, 839 
P.2d at 805-06 (footnotes omitted). If used properly, these doctrines all can serve to identify 
and protect the objective understanding of the consumer. 
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Professors Karl Llewellyn and E. Allan Farnsworth, and that both 
were soundly defeated in their attempt to rationalize this area of law. 
In 1941, Llewellyn prepared two drafts for the proposed revision 
to the Uniform Sales Act. III The first draft, which has never been 
published in its entirety before, I 12 contained a lengthy section devoted 
exclusively to form contracts. 113 In that section, Llewellyn explained 
again his view of form contracts and proposed a regulatory scheme to 
balance the competing interests. He entitled the section "DECLA-
RATION OF POLICY, AND PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO 
DISPLACEMENT OF SINGLE PROVISIONS OR GROUPS OF 
PROVISIONS BY AGREEMENT." 
The section generally permitted the enforcement of "particular-
ized terms," parts of a contract to which "both the parties have ... 
directed their attention."114 It declared, however, that assent to con-
tract terms which "are not studied and bargained about in detail by 
both parties" should not be presumed unless those terms were fair. lIS 
This section denied enforcement of form contracts containing 
unknown terms that altered the gap-filler provisions of the Code to 
the drafter's benefit, the so-called "jug-handled forms."116 Llewellyn 
challenged the notion that fundamental contract principles required 
enforcing unfair form contract terms as written: "The principle of 
freedom of bargain is a principle of freedom of intended bargain." 117 
When common-law courts first enunciated contract principles, Llew-
ellyn noted, written contracts reflected the result of true bargaining, 
and accordingly, it was fair to presume that a signature meant agree-
ment. 118 Modem form contracts, however, permitted bargaining on 
only a few terms such as "price, credit, date of delivery, description 
and quantity."1l9 The rest of the contract is not negotiated and is 
assumed to be the "fair and balanced" terms implied by law. 120 A 
form contract that altered these terms could not be presumed, by 
Ill. I first learned of Llewellyn'S first 1941 draft in Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and 
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967), which gives an 
extensive history of the drafting of U.C.C.'s § 2-302, the unconscionability provision. 
112. For the full text of Section l-C, see ApPENDIX. 
113. Karl N. Llewellyn, Unpublished First Draft of Revision to the Uniform Sales Act § 1-
C (Sept. 1941) (This draft is contained in a letter dated September 5, 1941, from Karl 
Llewellyn to Professor Underhill of Yale Law School. The letter and draft are available at the 
Yale Law School library). See ApPENDIX for full text of this document. 
114. Id. § l-C (1)(b). 
115. Id. § l-C (l)(d). 
116. Id. § l-C cmt. (A)(2). 
117. Id. § l-C cmt. (A)(3). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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itself, to reflect the intent of the non-drafting party because "deliber-
ate intent is not shown by a lop-sided form whose very content sug-
gests that it has not been carefully read, and the circumstances of 
whose execution suggest that the matters under discussion and con-
sideration were only the matters written or typed in."121 
According to Llewellyn, fair form contracts served many socially 
valuable functions. 122 Usefulness alone, however, did not require that 
their abuses be tolerated. "The true principle is clear enough," he 
stated. "The substitution of private rule-making by one party, in his 
own interest, for the balance provided by the law, is not to be recog-
nized without strong reason shown."123 
The heart of Llewellyn's proposed law was to permit the enforce-
ment of unbalanced form contracts only if the non-drafter had know-
ingly assented to them: 
If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to work a displace-
ment or modification of the provisions of this Act in an unfair and 
unbalanced fashion not required by the circumstances of the trade, 
then the party claiming application of any particular provision in 
such bloc must show that the other party, with due knowledge of 
the contents of that particular provision, intended that provision to 
displace or modify the relevant provision of this Act in regard to 
the particular transaction. 124 
If the changes from the background law were balanced the con-
tract would stand. To determine whether a fair balance existed, 
courts had to examine several circumstances, such as whether both 
parties helped prepare the contract, whether the displacement of pro-
visions "as a whole runs disproportionately in favor of one party," 
and whether the new provisions reflect "fair expectation" in light of 
trade practices. 12s 
Arguing that the proposed section would better fulfill the con-
tracting parties' expectations and reduce the confusion caused by judi-
cial attempts to avoid harsh form-contract terms, Llewellyn wrote 
that "the case for the provision stands . . . on the bewildering uncer-
tainty which exists today as to when a court will read one-party lan-
guage as it is written, and when it will find a way to avoid such 
121. [d. cmt. 3. 
122. "[T]he expression of a body of fair and balanced usage is a great convenience, a gain in 
clarity and certainty, an overcoming of the difficulty faced by the law in regulating the 
multitude of different trades." [d. § I-C. 
123. [d. 
124. [d. § l-C (2)(a)(i). 
125. [d. § I-C (2)(c). 
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language." 126 
Nevertheless, the drafting committee rejected the proposal. 
Llewellyn's second draft of the year reported simply their conclusion 
that the "machinery for administration thus far developed is inade-
quate, and is too unreckonable to be in keeping with the lines of the 
Draft."127 Two years later, the drafting committeed proposed a much 
shorter version of the section with a far more limited scope. Courts 
were to presume all but "unconscionable" form terms as terms to 
which both parties had assented, regardless of whether the consumer 
was aware of them. 128 Eventually this section metamorphosed into 
the current 2-302 unconscionability provision. 129 
The current U.C.C., therefore, lacks the straight-forward 
approach Llewellyn suggested. Rather than simply acknowledging 
the lack of assent restricting the enforcement of unknown one-sided 
terms, the Code awkwardly focuses on the undefined and far more 
limited concept of unconscionability. 130 
Many courts have utilized the concept of unconscionability to 
deal with the harshness of form contracts. 131 Unfortunately, the doc-
trine of unconscionability is too weak a tool to effectively analyze 
these contracts. The principal difficulty arises from determining how 
bad is unconscionable. 
The Official Comment circuitously indicates that a court may 
strike only those terms that are "so one-sided as to be unconscionable 
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the con-
tract."132 The classic definition of "unconscionable" terms, "such as 
126. [d. § 1-C cmt. (7)(b). 
127. THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT 51-52 (Report and Second Draft 1941). 
128. REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT § 24 (1943). 
129. As finally approved, U.C.C. § 2-302 (1) provides as follows: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce 
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
130. Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953). 
Perhaps, this is what Llewellyn was bemoaning when he wrote, "[T]here are so many beautiful 
ideas I tried to get in ... but I was voted down." One might assume that Llewellyn was 
merely relieved to have even this small victory when he termed § 2-302 "perhaps the most 
valuable section in the entire Code." LAW REVISION COMM'N OF NEW YORK, 1 N.Y.L. 
REPORT AND RECORD OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Pub. L. No. 65, 
121 (1954). 
131. See. e.g., Fontaine v, Industrial Nat'l Bank, 298 A.2d 521, 523 (R.1. 1973) (striking as 
unconscionable clause in loan contract permitting repossession of car without demand for 
payment). 
132. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989). The confused nature ofthis section is well-illustrated by 
the description in the Official Comment of the underlying purpose: "The principle is one of 
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no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one 
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other,"133 
fails to encompass the reality of modem form contracts. A wide 
range of unfairness and inefficiency would be permitted so long as the 
unread terms are not so extreme as to repulse people not under 
delusion. 
Unconscionability will remain an important concept, even if the 
objective theory of contracts is used for form contract situations. A 
court must retain the ability, in an imperfect world, to deny force to 
grotesquely unfair terms. As Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote, "Is 
there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly embedded 
. . . than the basic doctrine that courts will not permit themselves to 
be used as instrument of inequality and injustice."134 
Suppose, for example, the only electric company in town includes 
in the contract with its customers a confession of judgment provision. 
Even assuming consumers know of the term and reluctantly accept it, 
there would be something fundamentally wrong with a court permit-
ting such a clause to bar billing disputes. 13s 
Unconscionability should be saved for the extraordinarily 
unfair. 136 A more precise concept is needed for form contracts. 
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts acknowl-
edged the overlap between the U.C.C.'s unconscionability provision 
and the developing law of form contracts and recognized the need for 
a specific separate analysis of form contracts. 137 As with the U.C.C., 
the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of disturbance of allocation of 
risks because of superior bargaining power." Id. As has been frequently noted, § 2-302 seems 
to encompass two forms of unconscionability: "oppression" implies a substantive harm while 
"unfair surprise" implies procedural trickery. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 6. Arguably, a court 
needs both in order to strike a particular contract term. 
133. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of Chesterfield v. 
Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750». 
134. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
135. This concept is illustrated by Professor Eisenberg's example of the "desperate 
traveller," who is rescued from death in the desert only upon promising to pay his rescuer two-
thirds of his wealth or $100,000 whichever is greater. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain 
Principle and its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 755-56 (1982). 
136. Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1337 
(1982) ("[Unconscionability] stands today primarily as a backstop to catch any creative new 
practices slippery enough to get past other protective devices, yet odious enough to fall within 
its timid scope."). 
137. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 515, 523 (May 22, 1970) (Statement of Mr. Charles Hastings 
Willard). For an excellent discussion of the drafting of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CoNTRACTS, see John E. Murray, Jr., The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized 
Agreements under the Restatement (Second) o/Contracts, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1342 (1975). 
Professor (now Judge) Robert Braucher was the first Chief Reporter for the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS. After his appointment to the Supreme JUdicial Court of 
1993] REUNIFICATION OF CONTRACT 1287 
the path from visionary draft to final result is littered with missed 
opportunities. 
A 1970 draft of the section devoted to standardized agreements 
stated, "[ w ]here the other party has reason to know that the party 
manifesting such assent believes or assumes that the writing does not 
contain a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement."138 
This language focused on the non-drafter's knowledge and expecta-
tions. Under this version, form terms were not enforceable if the 
drafter slipped into the contract terms the reasonable consumer would 
not have expected. The consumer had to be aware of and consent to 
unusual or novel terms. Consequently, only expected or explained 
terms would have been enforceable. 
During the discussion of this section by the American Law Insti-
tute's review committee, opposition arose because it was feared that 
such a rule would impede freedom of contract. Charles Willard, a 
New York City lawyer, argued that "many of us have signed con-
tracts containing provisions that we wish weren't in there, but on bal-
ance we thought: All right, we want the contract, and we have to take 
the good with the bad."139 This reasoning ignores the reality that 
form terms are unread and often unexpected. Accordingly, consum-
ers are not actually deciding whether they desire the contract enough 
to take the good with the bad terms. Nevertheless, Willard offered 
replacement language that eventually became the final version of Sec-
tion 211(3): "Where the other party has reason to believe that the 
party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the 
writing contained 'a particular term, the term is not part of the 
agreement." 140 
Professor Farnsworth argued that such a rule would permit 
enforcement of unexpected terms: 
I'm troubled by the apparently simple form that contains a clause 
Massachusetts in 1971, he was replaced by Professor E. Allan Farnsworth. It was Professor 
Braucher who was the Chief Reporter when section 211, dealing with standardized contracts, 
was drafted. 
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237(3) (Tent. Draft No.5, 1970). 
139. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 528 (May 22, 1970) (Statement of Mr. Charles Hastings Willard). 
140. The remainder of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 reads: 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or 
otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like 
writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he 
adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms included 
in the writing. 
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those 
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the 
standard terms of the writing. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). 
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in the back of it, perhaps a more or less innocuous clause, but one 
which, it turns out, because of later events is important to the per-
son signing. It is quite possible, it seems to me, that under Mr. 
Willard's language it would not be clear that he would not have 
signed the agreement had he known that this clause was added; 
and yet under [the] original language it would not be a part of the 
contract. 141 
Professor Farnsworth was unable to convince other drafters to 
adopt his position. The final Restatement provision ignores the unfair 
form term that deals only with a secondary consideration or unlikely 
risk for the consumer. It has no effect unless the term is so egregious 
that it negates the entire contract. Thus, the evils of one-sided, 
unknown subordinate terms continue. 
The Comments to this Section of the Restatement, however, 
seem to permit a far more realistic approach. They assert that busi-
nesspeople who draft standardized agreements are aware that 
"[c]ustomers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the 
standard terms."142 The Comments further state that customers "are 
not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of reason-
able expectation."143 
This has enabled courts purporting to rely on Section 211 to 
actually improve upon it. The Arizona Supreme Court, in ostensibly 
adopting the rule of Section 211, held that courts should "enforce a 
boilerplate term unless the drafter had reason to believe that the 
adhering party would not have assented to the particular term had he 
or she known of its presence."l44 Note that this formulation of Sec-
tion 211 's rule involves the far more precise inquiry of whether a 
given term in the form contract would have been assented to had it 
been read and·understood. By contrast, the literal language of Section 
141. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 527 (May 22, 1970) (Statement of E. Allen Farnsworth). 
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1979). 
143. ld. § 211 cmt. f. This comment further develops the idea that non-assented to terms 
are non-binding, 
ld. 
[AJ party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does not assent to a 
term if the other party has reason to believe that the adhering party would not 
have accepted the agreement if he had known the agreement contained the 
particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be shown by the prior 
negotiations or inferred from the circumstances. Reason to believe may be 
inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre or oppressive, from the fact that it 
eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it 
eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if 
the adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible 
or otherwise hidden from view. 
144. Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283 (Ariz. 1987) (emphasis 
added). 
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211 permits enforcement of such an unwanted term unless the term 
was so important and unfair that the consumer would have refused to 
assent to the contract. As one commentator notes, the actual words 
of Section 211 of the Restatement ultimately amount to "nothing 
more than an effort to deal with a species of unconscionability."14s 
VI. OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
The objective theory of contracts has led to several rules for deal-
ing with circumstances where one party is aware of the other party's 
lack of knowledge. Normally, when one party, by research or fortui-
tously, learns information that affects the value of the bargain there is 
no duty to share that information. 146 There are, however, instances 
where it is both economically efficient and just to prevent a party, who 
is aware of the other's misunderstanding or lack of knowledge, from 
taking unfair advantage or from imposing unexpected risks and 
burdens. 147 
Those who possess both superior information and the knowledge 
of another's relative ignorance will not be permitted to pretend that 
they are dealing with someone possessing adequate knowledge. The 
doctrines of known unilateral mistake and of foreseeable consequent-
ial damages, the V.C.C.'s "Battle of the Forms" rule, and even the 
tort law requirement that doctors obtain their patients' informed con-
sent all share this underlying rationale. Close scrutiny of this theme 
permits not only a fuller understanding of the objective theory of con-
tracts, but also illustrates its proper application to form contracts. 
A. Known Misunderstanding or Unilateral Mistake 
Frequently, contracting parties disagree on the meaning of a 
term, but one party knows or should know of the other's differing 
belief. In such cases the courts will apply the meaning of the unknow-
ing party. 148 Professor Farnsworth tells the story of Temures, a legal-
145. Murray, supra note 137, at 1383. 
146. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1817). 
147. It is well established in contract law that "where the peculiar talent or the industry of 
one man has given him a superiority of knowledge," it is permissible for him to withhold such 
information. GULIAN C. VERPLANCK, AN EssAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CONTRACTS 75 
(Arno Press ed. 1972) (1825). Yet contracts that take advantage in any respect are presumed 
fraudulent when it is understood by the other that no advantage will be taken. Id. at 119. 
Verplanck argued that this reasoning applied to all sales and stated that if a seller's neighbor 
had such confidence that the seller would sell to him at market price and that the goods the 
seller offers were of merchantable quality, it would be unfair to take advantage of such 
confidence. Id. at 134. 
148. In the words of the early nineteenth century author Verplanck, a contract is breached 
"when the thing done, or delivered, varies materially in kind, or quality, from the kind or 
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istic warrior who promised a garrison that "no blood would be shed if 
they surrendered."149 Upon surrender, the garrison was buried alive, 
without so much as a loophole to breathe through. A modem court 
reviewing this agreement would find Temures guilty of a breach of 
contract because he should have been aware of the meaning that 
would likely be attached to his promise. 
A similar situation arises when one party is aware of the other 
party's mistake. Suppose a subcontractor submits a bid to the con-
tractor containing an obvious mathematical error. The contractor 
cannot happily accept the mistaken bid and pocket the windfall. ISO 
The law excuses the mistaken subcontractor from performance 
because the contractor had actual knowledge of the error. Moreover, 
courts often impute such knowledge to contractors who receive a 
range of bids of which one is markedly lower. The law does not 
reward the unquestioning contractor who rushes to accept an offer 
that is "too good to be true."lsl The subcontractor prevails because 
the contractor had "reason to know" of the error. 
Both rules have long been accepted as wise policy. One commen-
tator argued that the party who knows of an error is the "better mis-
take-preventer . . . because of his superior access to relevant 
information that will disclose the mistake and thus allow its correc-
tion."ls2 In other words, neither Temures nor the contractor should 
prevail because a reasonable person in their positions should have 
understood the probable intent of their negotiating partners. 
Allowing those with easy knowledge of another's error to take advan-
tage of that knowledge would be unjust. IS3 
The same theory should apply to consumer form contracts. 
Drafters know the terms of their own contracts and consumers do 
not. Since the drafters are aware that consumers do not read their 
contracts, the drafters know that the contract will not inform con-
quality ... understood by the one party, and known to be so understood by the other." Id. at 
148. 
149. Farnsworth, supra note 14, at 946 (quoting WILLIAM PALEY, PRINCIPLES OF MORAL 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, Book III, Part I, ch. V (12th ed. 1810». 
150. Tyra v. Cheney, 152 N.W. 835 (Minn. 1915). "One cannot snap up an offer or bid 
knowing that it was made in mistake." Id. 
151. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law a/Contracts, 
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,7 (1978); see, e.g., Geremia v. Boyarsky, 140 A. 749, 750 (Conn. 1928) 
(granting rescission where plaintiff had "good reason to believe that a substantial error had 
been made"); FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 668 (stating that a bidder can avoid a contract 
if the difference from other bids was so great "as to make the mistake palpable"). 
152. Kronman, supra note 151, at 7-8. 
153. The concept of "easy" knowledge is meant to distinguish the cases where the party 
with greater knowledge acquired such knowledge as the result "of a deliberate and costly 
search." Id. at 13. 
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sumers of their legal rights. Similarly, if a form contract contains a 
term that eviscerates the central purpose of the contract, contradicts 
representations made by the seller, or deals with secondary issues not 
considered by the typical consumer, the drafter should know that the 
written term is unexpected. Since the term is both unexpected and 
unknown to the consumer, the drafter also should know that the con-
sumer is mistaken about the contents of the contract. 
Drafters should not be permitted to take Temures-like advantage 
of consumers. As one court has stated, "[w]here a party permits 
another to sign a contract knowing that he is under a misapprehen-
sion as to its terms, there is equitable fraud which warrants reforma-
tion or recision."ls4 
B. The Rule 0/ Hadley v. Baxendale 
The classic case of Hadley v. Baxendale,lss recognizes the 
responsibility on a party with greater knowledge. In Hadley, a mill 
owner entrusted a broken engine shaft to a common carrier for deliv-
ery to a manufacturer as model for a replacement shaft. Due to the 
carrier's neglect, delivery took longer than expected, and the mill 
owner, who was unable to run the mill in the interim, suffered a loss 
of expected profits. The court denied recovery of lost profits and 
stated: 
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has 
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in 
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and 
reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. according to 
the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or 
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contem-
plation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it.ls6 
The court explained that breaching parties should not be respon-
sible for special circumstances of which they are unaware, because 
they can "only be supposed to have ... in [their] contemplation the 
amount of injury which would arise generally."ls7 The court also rea-
soned that those who face special losses have an obvious protection of 
154. Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 291 A.2d 858, 863 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1972); 
see also Miller v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 62 P.2d 975, 977-78 (Okla. 1936) (finding 
such exploitation to be constructive fraud); Daskolopoulos v. European Am. Bank Trust Co., 
481 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding allegations sufficient to raise issue of 
fact as to whether plaintiff misunderstood the nature of lease obligations and whether 
defendants were aware of that misunderstanding). 
155. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
156. Id. at lSI. 
157.Id. 
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their interests by disclosing their unexpected situation. The court 
stated: 
Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was 
actually made was communicated by the plaintiffs to the defend-
ants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from 
the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably con-
template, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily 
follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances 
so known and communicated. ISS 
Thus, the rule of Hadley is that breachers are responsible only 
for consequential damages they "reasonably contemplate," either 
because such damages are "naturally occurring" or because they have 
been disclosed. In other words, the risk of loss assumed by the prom-
isor is that which the reasonable person in the position of the prom-
isor would foresee. 
There are several sound reasons for such a rule. First, if promis-
ors know of special circumstances, they can negotiate special contract 
terms. 1 S9 Second, with adequate knowledge the eventual breacher 
might well have decided that the likely gain from the contract was not 
worth the risk of substantial damages, and thus would have foregone 
the deal. Finally, greater care in negotiation might be taken, com-
mensurate with the greater risk. The rule of Hadley "induces the 
party with knowledge of the risk either to take any appropriate pre-
cautions himself or, if he believes that the other party might be the 
more efficient loss avoider, to disclose the risk to that party."I60 
The same logic applies where the drafter of a form contract 
inserts burdens and risks of which the consumer is unaware. Without 
knowing these terms, the consumer can neither negotiate different 
terms, avoid an unduly risky venture, nor utilize greater care in nego-
tiations. It is incumbent upon the contract drafter, like the mill 
owner, to disclose the greater risks and permit consumers to assume 
the costs of just those losses within their "reasonable contemplation." 
Without the seller's disclosure of unexpected terms, consumers should 
be held to only such risks "as may reasonably be supposed to have 
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the 
contract .... "161 
158. [d. 
159. The Hadley court stated that, "of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive 
[the promisors]." [d. 
160. Posner, supra note 3, at 61. 
161. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at lSI (emphasis added). 
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C. The U. C. C. and the Battle of the Forms 
Imagine a seller with two customers: a large business making 
multiple purchases and an individual consumer. Assume that both 
the business buyer and the consumer order goods from the seller. The 
business buyer sends a purchase order drafted by one of her attorneys 
while the consumer orders by telephone. Neither buyer mentions the 
implied warranty of merchantability in the order. Prior to shipment, 
the seller sends identical acknowledgement forms to both purchasers, 
disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability in large capital 
letters. The business buyer forwards the form to her lawyer for filing; 
the consumer puts the form in a kitchen drawer. Neither of them 
reads the form. When the goods arrive defective, the seller raises the 
acknowledgement form as a defense. Who has the better chance of 
having the seller's unread limitation clause declared ineffective: the 
business buyer supported by a staff of lawyers or the solitary 
consumer? 
While the answer for the case of the consumer is uncertain, 162 
thanks to the "battle of the forms" section of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code the business buyer will prevail because disclaiming the 
implied warranty of merchantability is a "material alteration" of the 
bargain.163 This section was designed to cover situations where two 
parties, usually merchants, exchange forms without reading the other 
party's form. For those circumstances, the Code changes the com-
mon-law "mirror image" rule and permits a contract to be formed 
even if the forms contain non-identical terms. l64 If courts recognize 
such a contract, they need to determine which document's terms 
become part of the contract. Section 2-207 (2) provides that, between 
merchants, additional terms in the offeree's form become part of the 
contract unless they "materially alter" the bargain. 165 
This is a sensible rule, based on the reality that the forms are not 
read and on the sense that permitting an acceptor to alter the terms of 
the bargain unilaterally in an unexpected material way is unfair and 
uneconomical. 166 The Code's Official Comments state that if the 
offeree's terms "are such as materially to alter the original bargain," 
162. See infra text accompanying notes 169-172. 
163. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (1989). See, e.g., Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet 
Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 853 (Okla. 1979) (holding such a disclaimer to be a new term 
materially altering the contract and thus not part of the bargain). 
164. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1). 
165. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2)(b). The new terms also do not become part of the contract if they 
are objected to in the offer itself, by restricting acceptance to only the terms of the offer, or by 
notification shortly after receipt of the return form. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2)(a), (c). 
166. FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 161. 
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they do not become part of the contract "unless expressly agreed to by 
the other party."167 The Comments also point out that "express 
awareness by the other party" is the only way enforcement of such 
terms would not result in "surprise or hardship."168 
It would be illogical, if not plain silly, to prevent a consumer 
from making the same argument. Both the business buyer and the 
consumer had objectively reasonable expectations that the goods 
would be at least of "average" quality.169 Neither read the seller's 
forms, which is what the seller would expect. If a disclaimer of war-
ranty "materially alters" the bargain for the experienced business 
buyer, it must surely do the same for the consumer. If anyone is to be 
penalized for not reading the acknowledgement form, it should be the 
merchant buyer with her cadre of lawyers, not the untrained, inexpe-
rienced consumer. 
The judicial experience with Section 2-207 is useful to determine 
which terms are presumably within the consumer's objective under-
standing of the merchant's form. In addition to refusing to enforce 
disclaimers of warranties, courts applying Section 2-207 have also 
refused to enforce clauses that limit the remedy for breach of war-
ranty to replacement,170 require the buyer to pay the seller's attor-
neys' fees,171 mandate the seller's choice of law,172 or compel 
arbitration. 173 
If courts do not enforce such terms, absent knowing assent, 
against a merchant engaging in the battle of the forms, they certainly 
should not enforce them against the unarmed consumer. Consumers, 
no less than merchants, are entitled to enter contracts free from sur-
prise and hardship. 
167. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 3. 
168. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4. 
169. This was Professor Prosser's argument in favor of enforcing disclaimers of the 
warranty of merchantability only with actual assent. See supra text accompanying notes 67-
73. 
170. Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Kentucky Elec. Steel Co., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 1430 
(E.D. Pa. 1983). 
171. Johnson Tire Serv., Inc. v. Thorn, Inc., 613 P.2d 521 (Utah 1980). 
172. General Instrument Corp. v. Tie Mfg. Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); see 
also Pacamor Bearings, Inc. V. Molon Motors & Coil, Inc., 477 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984). But see Coastal Indust., Inc. V. Automatica Steam Prods. Corp., 654 F.2d 375, 379 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (holding choice of New York law did not materially alter the contract because 
"[t]he application of New York law comports with the objective intent of the parties ... in that 
New York law bears a reasonable relation to the sales transaction in issue"). 
173. Coastal Indus., 654 F.2d at 379; see also Duplan Corp. V. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, 
Inc., 442 F. Supp. 86, 89 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); Marlene Indus. Corp. V. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 
N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 1978). But see Diskin V. J.P. Stevens, 652 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1987) 
(holding that arbitration clause does not materially alter the contract when trade usage 
indicates that arbitration is common). 
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D. Informed Consent 
To facilitate understanding of the relationship between knowl-
edge and assent one can draw a useful comparison with the tort law 
requirement that physicians obtain a patient's informed consent 
before commencing treatment. This requirement predates the Ameri-
can Revolution,174 and is based on the principle that "[e]very human 
being ... has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body." 175 
Courts have consistently recognized that "[t]rue consent to what 
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options avail-
able and the risks attendant upon each."176 The patient's "right of 
self decision . . . can be effectively exercised only if the patient pos-
sesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice."177 
Medical knowledge is not presumed to be in the possession of the 
non-expert patient. "The doctrine of informed consent takes full 
account of the probability that unlike the physician, the patient is 
untrained in the medical science, and therefore depends completely on 
the trust and skill of his physician for the information on which he 
makes his decision."178 Patients are not responsible for ferretting out 
the necessary relevant information, because few patients have the 
knowledge and ability to "identify the relevant questions in the 
absence of prior explanation by the physician. Physicians and hospi-
tals have patients of widely divergent socio-economic backgrounds, 
and a rule which presumes a degree of sophistication which many 
members of society lack is likely to breed gross inequities." 179 
To ensure that consent to medical procedures is true informed 
174. "[I]t was improper to disunite the callous without consent; this is the usage and law of 
surgeons .... " Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767) (quoted in 
LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983». 
175. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.). Some 
courts have premised the doctor's duty to disclose information on a fiduciary· type relationship 
with a patient. See, e.g., Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (N.M. 1962). One can argue 
that a lawyer drafting a form contract who is aware that the consumer will not rely on legal 
counsel in determining whether to sign the contract also has a fiduciary-type obligation not to 
overreach against the uncounseled consumer. 
176. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,780 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Sard v. Hardy, 379 
A.2d 1014, 1019 (Md. 1977) (stating that effective consent "must have been an 'informed' 
consent, one that is given after the patient has received a fair and reasonable explanation of the 
contemplated treatment or procedure."). 
177. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786; see also Pegram v. Sisco, 406 F. Supp. 776, 779 (W.D. 
Ark. 1976). 
178. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1020. 
179. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783 n.36. 
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consent, doctors must disclose material risks.180 This requirement 
squares with the objective theory of contracts. A reasonable physi-
cian should not assume that a patient consents to medical procedures 
unless the doctor has provided the information necessary to permit an 
informed choice. 181 
The objective theory protects the physician as well. If the infor-
mation is presented in an appropriate manner, it is irrelevant whether 
an individual patient sUbjectively understands the situation, since "the 
physician discharges the duty when he makes a reasonable effort to 
convey sufficient information, although the patient, without fault of 
the physician, may not fully grasp it."182 Similarly, the information 
the doctor must convey is based on what the doctor would reasonably 
assume the patient did not know: "There is no obligation to commu-
nicate those [dangers] of which persons of average sophistication are 
aware. Even more clearly, the physician bears no responsibility for 
discussion of hazards the patient has already discovered . . . ." 183 
Courts reviewing consumer form contracts should apply similar 
principles. A consumer's true assent should be understood as the 
informed exercise of a choice, which is effectively exercised only if the 
consumer possesses enough information to make an intelligent choice. 
As with medical knowledge, knowledge of legal rules cannot be 
presumed for the layperson. As patients are generally uneducated 
about medical procedures, few consumers possess the legal acumen 
even to identify the relevant questions. Consumers should only be 
held to have consented to unread terms of which they have been 
informed. 
Drafters of form contracts must not be permitted to presume 
assent to unexpected terms unless they adequately disclosed such 
terms. In the world of contracts, as in the realm of medicine, true 
assent by the non-expert requires informed consent. 
VII. EARLY JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS AT A UNIFIED THEORY 
In the 1950s, courts began to consider directly the issue of form 
contracts as a category unto themselves. While courts did not change 
the classic framework, some judges began arguing for a "realistic" 
resolution of these cases. 
180. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022. "A material risk is one which a physician knows or ought to 
know would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position .... " 
181. See Rogers v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 119 So. 2d 649, 652 (La. Ct. App. 
1960) (characterizing general consent to all procedures "as found necessary" to be "almost 
completely worthless"). 
182. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15. 
183. ld. 
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In Siegelman v. Cunard White Star,184 the Second Circuit 
enforced language from a cruise line's contract limiting the time for 
passengers to file suit to one year. In dissent, Judge Frank urged the 
court to consider the cruise contract a "contract of adhesion" and 
argued that courts should refuse "to enforce directly ... highly unfair 
provisions of all so-called 'contracts of adhesion' where there was no 
possibility of real bargaining."18s Contending that the consumer did 
not really assent to the unknown terms in the form contracts, Judge 
Frank stated "[i]n such a standardized or mass-production agree-
ment, with one-sided control of its terms, when the one party has no 
real bargaining power, the usual contract rules, based on the idea of 
'freedom of contract,' cannot be applied rationally. For such a con-
tract is 'sold not bought.' " 186 
A few years later, an Illinois appellate court criticized its own 
state's Supreme Court for upholding lease provisions exempting land-
lords from liability to tenants. 187 The lower court argued that when 
standard forms are offered on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis, "there 
remains little of the element of liberty to contract as one chooses, 
which is the essence of the public policy of freedom of contract."188 
The court argued that "this fragment of a liberty" must not trump the 
state's policy that people should be liable for harm they inflict 
through the negligent performance of their duties. 
Soon thereafter, courts began to create rules explicitly governing 
form contracts. The two most influential cases were Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors 189 and Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co. 190 
In Henningsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to 
enforce a form term severely limiting the warranty protection for a 
new automobile. 191 Critics of this case point to the court's reliance on 
the fact that there were only a few car manufacturers and that they all 
184. 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955). 
185. [d. at 205 (Frank, J., dissenting). He noted, "The one party dictates its provisions; the 
other has no more choice in fixing those terms than he has about the weather." [d. at 204. 
186. [d. at 204. 
187. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld such a clause in O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith 
Realty Co., 155 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 1958). 
188. Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldg., 155 N.E.2d 372 (III. App. Ct. 1958). 
189. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
190. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
191. The warranty clause, in fine print on the back of contract, limited warranty protection 
to the first ninety days or 4000 miles, whichever came first, and required that the consumer 
prepay shipping charges for transporting the defective automobile to the manufacturer. 
Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 74. The clause concluded that "this warranty being expressly in lieu 
of all other warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its part." 
[d. 
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used the same disclaimer. 192 The real lesson of Henningsen has been 
its recognition that the paradigm of free bargaining is absent from 
consumer form contracts. The dealer presented the contract to the 
Henningsens "without authority to alter it; his function is ministe-
rial-simply to deliver it."193 The fine print on the back of the con-
tract "was such as to promote lack of attention rather than sharp 
scrutiny" and even if a consumer saw the language, the ordinary 
layperson would not "realize what he was relinquishing in return for 
what he was being granted."194 Accordingly, the general principle 
that those who do not read contracts cannot escape from unknown 
terms has "prove[n] to be inadequate under the impact of later experi-
ence."19S The unilaterally imposed contract terms "resemble a law 
rather than a meeting of the minds."196 Thus, based on "public pol-
icy," the Henningsens recovered for the damage caused by the defec-
tive automobile, despite the contract's disclaimer. 197 
The Williams court used the doctrine of unconscionability to jus-
tify its refusal to enforce a densely written "add-on" clause, which 
allowed the seller to repossess every item previously sold to a con-
sumer in the event of a single default. 198 This case has also been sub-
ject to criticism, especially for its discussion of the particular 
consumer's lack of education and status as a welfare recipient. 199 
Nonetheless, Williams is important for any understanding of form 
contracts, because it stands on the fact that the consumer not only 
was unaware of the add-on clause, but that the seller knew of this 
unawareness. The court concluded that when a consumer signs such 
a "commercially unreasonable" contract, "with little or no knowledge 
of its terms," it cannot be said "that his consent, or even an objective 
192. The court limited its holding due to the "unique" status of the 1960 American 
automobile industry, where oligopolistic conspiracies prevented effective bargaining: 
The status of the automobile industry is unique. Manufacturers are few in 
number and strong in bargaining position. In the matter of warranties on the 
sale of their products [they] present a united front. From the standpoint of the 
purchaser, there can be no arms length negotiating on the subject. 
[d. at 94. But courts rely on the case when form contracts are used, even in the absence of 
oligopolistic conditions. See, e.g., Higel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989-90 (Colo. 
1976) (discussing Henningsen as applying to disclaimers of warranties in a "consumer sale."). 
193. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 87. 
194. [d. at 92. 
195. [d. at 84. 
196. [d. at 86. 
197. [d. at 94-95. 
198. The clause stated that "all payments now and hereafter made by [purchaser] shall be 
credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Company by [purchaser] 
at the time each such purchase is made." Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 
445,447 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The court accurately termed this a "rather obscure provision." [d. 
199. [d. at 448-49. 
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manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. "200 Thus, 
the reasonable merchant cannot assume assent to an unknown, unrea-
sonable term and cannot demand its enforcement. 
Since these early attempts to solve the form contact delimma, 
courts throughout the country have begun to interpret form contracts 
based on the reasonable understanding of the consumer rather than 
on the actual terms known only to the drafter. While courts use a 
wide range of formulations to reach their conclusions, their common 
ground is a realistic application of the objective theory of contracts. 
VIII. THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONSUMER FORM 
CONTRACTS 
The typical consumer neither reads nor comprehends the terms 
of a form contract.201 More significantly, because drafters know that 
consumers are unaware of the terms of the contract they cannot rea-
sonably believe that consumers have agreed to the unknown terms. 
What, then, should a reasonable drafter believe consumers are think-
ing when they sign the contract? 
As a general rule, consumers should only be bound by those con-
tract terms that they know and comprehend.202 The central or dick-
ered terms of a contract properly bind the consumer because the 
consumer is obviously aware of them. 203 
Similarly, when a consumer reads and comprehends subordinate 
terms or when the seller points out and explains a complex term, the 
seller should be able to treat the consumer's assent as an assent to the 
discussed term.204 Absent policy reasons to the contrary, such as a 
200. ld. at 449 (emphasis added). 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. 
202. All contract provisions, however, are subject to unconscionability analysis. See supra 
text accompanying notes 129-32. 
203. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 84, at 370. 
204. See Meyers v. Guarantee Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 144 Cal. Rptr. 616, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1978) (stating that because borrower "admitted to having read and understood the contract, 
his subjective expectations were not objectively reasonable"). Professor Keeton has argued to 
the contrary. "If the enforcement of a policy provision would defeat the reasonable 
expectations of the great majority of policyholders to whose claim it is relevant, it will not be 
enforced even against those who know of its restrictive terms." ROBERT E. KEETON, 
INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT § 6.3(b), at 358 (1971). He reasoned that a policyholder who 
takes the time to read and understand the policy should not be penalized for doing so. ld. 
Keeton's argument flies in the face of the objective theory of contracts. A consumer who 
knows of and understands a term and then assents to a contract can reasonably be held to have 
agreed to that term by not objecting to it. This rule does not put a premium on ignorance. See 
Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 155 (Ind. 1971) (Prentice, J., dissenting). First, 
since very few consumers read their contracts, the number of consumers affected is minuscule. 
Second, the contract drafter, by pointing out unusual terms, can avoid the consumer's 
ignorance as well as the drafter's advantage therefrom. 
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merchant's promise not to enforce a term, unconscionably onerous 
terms/os or inherently coercive situations,206 knowledgeable consum-
ers should be held to their agreements. 
The degree of disclosure required of the seller is that which 
enables a reasonable consumer to understand both the meaning and 
effect of a term. One court stated that obtaining the consumer's 
knowing assent "could easily have been done in this case by explain-
ing to plaintiff in laymen's terms the meaning and possible conse-
quences of the disputed clause.''207 Even if an individual consumer 
does not understand the clause, the drafter can reasonably rely on an 
objectively adequate disclosure. 
In cases where a consumer does not know or understand the 
terms of a form contract, courts must examine the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction to determine the consumer's objective 
understanding. Because the consumer is clearly acquiring something, 
courts can look to the "purpose" for the acquisition: Why would one 
likely make such a purchase? Consumers share a basic understanding 
of what is to be expected from a particular product or service. For 
example, if a consumer calls and orders a pizza to be delivered and 
the store sends over a piece of cooked dough covered with pineapple 
rather than tomato or cheese, the consumer may rightfully reject the 
delivery. 
Next, courts should determine whether the business seller or ser-
vice provider had reason to assume that the item or service being 
205. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
206. Examples of coercive situations include a doctor's waiting room just prior to surgery, 
see infra text accompanying note 319, or a monopolistic environment, see, e.g., Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69, 94 (N.J. 1960). It has been argued that notice will not assist 
consumers who are not free to bargain. See Mueller, supra note 4, at 581. Outside of coercive 
situations, a consumer with understanding and knowledge can indeed leave a take-it-or-Ieave-it 
proposition. For example, if a consumer tells a film processor that she greatly values a roll of 
film and is told that the store does not guarantee its work, if the film is later lost or ruined, the 
developer should not be responsible for damages beyond replacement of the film. A consumer 
who proceeds to make a contract on such terms should be held to assume the risk of loss. Cf, 
Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1979) (no clear notice given). For a 
discussion of Mieske, see infra text accompanying notes 268-71. However. merchants must 
not be permitted to entice a consumer into a deal and then spring an unfair term on the 
consumer at the last minute when backing out of the contract would be impractical, expensive, 
or difficult. The test should be whether a reasonable person in the drafter'S position would 
understand that voluntary assent had been given. 
207. Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp .• 415 F. Supp. 264. 269 (E.D. Mich. 1976); see also Wheeler 
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775. 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) ("The hospital's admission 
clerk need only direct the patient's attention to the arbitration provision, request him to read 
it, and give him a simple explanation of its purpose and effect. including the available 
options. "). This standard is similar to that for informed consent to medical procedures, which 
requires "a reasonable effort to convey sufficient information .... " Canterbury v. Spence. 464 
F.2d 772, 780 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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acquired was not expected to perform to industry standards.208 
Absent solid evidence to the contrary, courts should find that the rea-
sonable consumer does not intend to waste money by paying "market 
price" for unmarketable goods or services. If you hire someone to 
mow your lawn, you expect the work done to be of "reasonable 
quality." 
Courts also need to expect that the consumer is likely to have 
spoken with a salesperson or agent and may well have seen advertise-
ments for the product or service. Statements made by both seller and 
consumer contribute to the average customer's understanding of con-
tractual rights and remedies .. 
Other important considerations, however, are usually totally 
absent from a consumer's contemplation at the time of contracting. 
For example, consumers rarely consider even the possibility of a sub-
sequent legal action. Courts and sellers should realize that consumers 
do not knowingly assent to terms that effectively discard their legal 
rights. 
Such considerations do not interfere with true freedom of con-
tract. Merchants remain free to create the bargain they desire as long 
as the consumer knowingly assents. The affirmative duty placed on 
the seller to inform consumers of unexpected terms creates a con-
tracting situation far closer to the paradigm of the classic "bargaining 
table" than any anachronistic duty-to-read rule. As one court 
observed: 
Such a requirement does not detract from the freedom to contract, 
unless that phrase denotes the freedom to impose the onerous 
terms of one's carefully-drawn printed document on an unsuspect-
ing contractual partner. Rather, freedom to contract is enhanced 
by a requirement that both parties be aware of the burdens they are 
assuming. 209 
Only through a realistic application of the objective theory to 
form contracts can both sellers and consumers exercise the free will 
essential to the freedom of contract. A growing number of courts 
recognize this principle. Some courts utilize the "doctrine of reason-
able expectations,"210 while others discuss "contracts of adhesion"211 
or "unconscionability."212 Another group unfortunately resorts to 
208. See Prosser, supra note 67, at 160. 
209. Johnson, 415 F. Supp. at 269. 
210. See Ware, supra note 3, at 1467. See also Puritan Life Ins. Co. v. Guess, 598 P.2d 900, 
904 (Alaska 1979). 
211. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981). 
212. See, e.g., Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 315 A.2d 16, 18 (N.J. 1974). 
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judicial subterfuge,213 which so offended Llewellyn, to reach the same 
result. Nevertheless, a review of how these courts enforce the objec-
tive understanding of the parties, rather than mechanically applying 
the literal written language, brings the modem practice into sharper 
focus. 
A. The Purpose of the Contract 
Every contract has a purpose. Under contract law, the undis-
closed sUbjective purpose of the parties is irrelevant. Instead, courts 
are concerned with "objective" purpose. Where there is a "common" 
or "obvious" reason for the transaction, courts rarely permit 
unknown contract terms to defeat that purpose. 
Consider the case of a consumer renting an automobile who paid 
extra for a "physical damage waiver" (POW) or a "collision damage 
waiver" (COW), whereby the rental car company agreed to waive all 
claims against the renter for damage to the car.214 The car was subse-
quently damaged in an accident, and the renter was issued a traffic 
citation. The rental company argued that the renter was liable 
because he had violated a contract clause prohibiting the use of the 
car "in violation of any laws or ordinances applicable to the operation 
... of the vehicle."21s Because the unread clause would defeat the 
obvious purpose behind the purchase of the POW, the court rejected 
this contention, stating: 
Clearly, consumers ... elect PDW coverage with the reasonable 
expectation that if they are involved in an automobile accident, 
they are protected from damage liability, regardless of fault. To 
permit the insertion of technical language in a standard form con-
tract that would nullify PDW coverage whenever the operator's 
simple negligence results in a traffic violation defeats the purpose of 
purchasing such coverage.216 
Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court refused to enforce unam-
biguous contractual language eliminating collision damage waiver 
protection for inter alia falling asleep at the wheeP17 The court rea-
213. See Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 291 A.2d 858, 863 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1972) 
(equitable fraud); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1977) (forfeiture); Elliot 
Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 813 (R.I. 1977) (finding ambiguity in a contract 
containing "an admittedly unequivocal provision"); Smith v. The Peoples Bank of Elk Valley, 
No. 0IAOI-9111-CV-00421, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 477, at ·10 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 
1992) (public interest); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex. 1975) (public 
policy). 
214. Syme v. Marks Rentals, Inc., 520 A.2d 1110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987). 
215. [d. at 1114. 
216. [d. 
217. Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987). One of 16 exceptions 
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soned that while "[t]he contract appears to absolve the renter ofliabil-
ity for damage to the car if the renter purchases the CDW ... [t]he 
exceptions swallow the protection."218 The court stated, "It is only 
after reading and digesting those sections that the reader would real-
ize the full import of the limitations on the rental company's 
waiver."219 Because the unread exception contradicted the very con-
cept of the CD W, the court refused to enforce the exception and 
thereby defeat the purpose of the contract. 220 
Protecting the purpose of the contract frequently requires strik-
ing unknown disclaimers of implied warranties.221 When someone 
purchases a new machine designed to make concrete blocks, for 
example, absent contrary discussion, the objective understanding is 
that the machine will successfully make concrete blocks.222 In Myers 
v. Land,223 the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to uphold contrac-
tual language that denied the existence of implied warranties in the 
sale of such a machine. The court noted: 
Though the present disclaimer of warranty is clear in its terms, we 
cannot overlook the fact that it is to be found in a long and formi-
to the CWP listed on the back page, the provision provided that the "[v]ehicle shall not be 
used or operated by any person ... who is not sufficiently alert or capable or properly or safely 
driving vehicle." [d. 
218. [d. at 650, 652. 
219. [d. at 650. 
220. [d. at 652. The Supreme Court of Nevada likewise refused to deprive a driver of 
liability protection after the driver made an improper left tum which resulted in an accident, 
arguing that such an interpretation would "read a very material limitation into the waiver 
agreement." Automobile Leasing & Rental, Inc. v. Thomas, 679 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1984). The 
court reasoned that "[t]he ordinary reader would not assume that an unqualified promise of 
this nature only covered accidents not caused by the negligence of the operator of the 
automobile. Indeed just the opposite is true. [A collision waiver] is generally understood to 
cover whatever accidents occur, regardless of the negligence of the operator." [d. at 1271 
(quoting Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (R.1. 1977) (limiting scope of 
collision insurance restriction». Accord Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986); 
Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales and Serv., 828 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1991). 
221. See. e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 125 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1982) ("Since a product's performance forms the fundamental basis for a sales contract, it is 
patently unreasonable to assume that a buyer would purchase a standardized mass-produced 
product from an industry seller without any enforceable performance standards."); Steele v. 
J.1. Case Co., 419 P.2d 902, 903 (Kan. 1966) (striking limit on warranty liability for sale of 
farm equipment where seller knew "the urgency of harvest" and the limitation was never 
"called to the buyer's attention"); Berg v. Stromme, 484 P.2d 380, 385 (Wash. 1971) ("The 
purported disclaimers of warranty ... highlight the absurdity of a rule of law which elevates 
these bland and substantially meaningless terms and conditions above the individually and 
expressly negotiated terms and conditions .... "). Of course, a buyer is always free to purchase 
knowingly an item without a warranty. See Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 609,617 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1966) ("When two parties bargain on an equal basis and the buyer is willing to 
buy a pig in a poke there is no policy of the law to prevent such a transaction. "). 
222. Myers v. Land, 235 S.W.2d 988 (Ky. 1950). 
223. [d. 
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dable document prepared by the seller and that it was doubtless 
unnoticed or its import uncomprehended by the buyer. Anyone 
brought up to believe that for every wrong there is a remedy will 
pause before saying that the seller will escape all liability by merely 
putting in an order blank a statement to the effect that there is no 
assurance that the buyer will get a machine that will work. We have 
paused for the moment and have readily concluded that the avoid-
ance of liability under such a circumstance is not permitted by the 
law.224 
Numerous insurance cases hold that because the insured is 
attempting to purchase protection against a particular contingency 
undisclosed terms should not be permitted to defeat this expecta-
tion.22s In Puritan Life Insurance Co. v. Guess,226 a consumer entered 
into a contract for life insurance after paying a $100 premium and 
getting a receipt.227 The consumer was unaware that this was a so-
called "conditional receipt," which provided coverage only after a 
medical examination. The Alaska Supreme Court held that insureds 
who pay a premium reasonably expect coverage for their money. The 
court therefore refused to enforce the "conditional receipt" language 
because it would have defeated the logical purpose of the payment. 
The court placed the burden of showing adequate disclosure on the 
insurer, stating: 
[W]e require that the insurer's agent, who negotiates the applica-
tion, personally draw to the attention of the applicant any limiting 
condition. The insurer has the burden of showing that it had taken 
appropriate steps to inform the applicant for insurance of such 
conditions, and that the applicant, therefore, could not have had a 
reasonable expectation that he was immediately protected.228 
224. [d. (emphasis added). See also Martin v. Harris Joseph Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 
1985) (refusing to enforce disclaimer of warranty on seeds sold to farmer); Chandler v. Aero 
Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 1967) (refusing to enforce written limit on 
moving company's liability "unless the shipper had been given reasonable notice by the carrier 
that he actually had a choice of 'higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater 
or lesser charge.' ") (citations omitted); Mallory v. Conida Warehouses, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 825, 
828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 554 P.2d 349 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (striking warranty disclaimer for used car); Klein, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 615-
17 (same). 
225. See. e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 824 P.2d 302, 306 
(N.M. 1992) (holding that "a policy provision excluding liability should be disregarded or 
stricken because it is repugnant to--i.e., contradicts-a provision extending coverage to 
certain losses"). 
226. 598 P.2d 900, 902 (Alaska 1979). 
227. [d. at 902. 
228. [d. at 906; see also Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Pa. 
1978) (stating that "if nothing is said about the complicated and legalistic phrasing of the 
receipt, and the agent accepts an application for insurance together with the first premium 
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Similarly, those purchasing theft burglary insurance reasonably 
expect coverage against "a bona fide third party burglary,"229 and 
those purchasing life insurance reasonably expect coverage against 
unintentional death,230 and a couple purchasing automobile insurance 
together reasonably expects to be insured regardless of which spouse 
is driving.231 In the automobile insurance case, the court added: 
The possibility remains that these limitations were called to [the 
husband's] or [the wife's] attention, that [the husband] and not [the 
wife] was the named insured for a specific reason, such as the 
request of either, or that for some other reason the transaction was 
accomplished in accordance with the understandings or wishes of 
the parties. If [the insurance company] can prove this, we will 
enforce the limitation of coverage against [the wife].232 
Of course, looking to the purpose of a transaction can also work 
in favor of the seller.233 In Estrin Construction Co. v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co. ,234 a contractor purchased general liability insurance for 
a construction project. When a wall collapsed, the contractor 
attempted to recover under the policy for its own losses.235 The insur-
ance company refused to pay, citing a clause that excluded payments 
for property damaged while in the "care, custody or control" of the 
contractor.236 The court ruled for the insurance company, stating 
that "[t]he dominant purpose of such a standard liability insurance 
policy . . . is to insure against liability to others, not to oneself. The 
exception, therefore, subserves the dominant purpose of the transac-
tion, rather than avoids that purpose."237 
payment, the applicant has reason to believe that he is insured. Otherwise, he is deceived.") 
(quoting Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 483 P.2d 682, 685 (Idaho 1971». 
229. C & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975). See 
also Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 668 (N.D. 1977) ("It is not 
unreasonable for a buyer to have a reasonable expectation that when he buys and pays for 
'farm liability' insurance, it will cover liability arising out of any of his normal farming 
operation, unless excluded operations are called to his attention."). 
230. See. e.g., Jones v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). See 
generally Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y. 1930) ("A policy 
of insurance is not accepted with the thought that its coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo 
or a Hercules. "). 
231. Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 281 (Ariz. 1987). 
232. [d. at 285. 
233. See. e.g., Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 621 (Iowa 
1984) (holding that a due-on-sale clause in a home mortgage did not contradict the dominant 
purposes of the transaction--either purchasing a house or permitting the buyers to sell the 
property later at a profit). 
234. 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
235. [d. at 415. 
236. [d. 
237. [d. See also Continental Ins. Co. v. Bussel, 498 P.2d 706 (Alaska 1972). In Bussel, a 
liability insurance policy was held not to include death benefits owed by an employer to 
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The goal of the objective theory of form contracts is not to 
reward the consumer,238 but to effectuate the reasonable understand-
ing of the contracting parties. Unread and undisclosed form terms 
should not defeat the purpose of a contract. Courts, accordingly, 
should read restrictive terms in the context of the overall purpose of 
the contract. Where the restrictive term effectively defeats the essen-
tial purpose of the contract, the restrive term must give way. 
B. The Purpose of the Clause 
Just as every contract has a purpose, so does every clause. 
Although clauses may have multiple or even different purposes for 
each party, there should always be an answer to the question "Why is 
this clause in the contract?" The focus of this inquiry will often be to 
determine what contingency the clause was intended to cover or what 
risk was sought to be avoided. 
Even a clause with a valid purpose may be illegitimate if its reach 
exceeds its purpose. If two parties with equal knowledge hammer out 
a deal, negotiations will tend to lead to clauses that serve intended 
purposes without unreasonably harming either party.239 In a non-
negotiated form contract, there is no such check on overbroad provi-
sions far exceeding legitimate purposes. Sellers should realize that 
consumers signing form contracts implicitly assume that the contract 
terms serve legitimate purposes without causing unnecessary harm. 
Courts should therefore enforce obscure or hidden form terms only to 
the extent that the terms serve legitimate interests. 240 
For example, courts permit a form contract clause to reduce the 
statutory time for filing causes of action because legitimate interests 
are at stake. The shortening of a statute of limitations can help insur-
ance companies protect against fraudulent claims that cannot be 
refuted due to lost witnesses, misplaced evidence, and faded memo-
ries. 241 Such a clause, though, should only block a valid claim when it 
employees: "The policy itself is entitled, 'Liability Insurance Policy' as contrasted with the 
title of a life insurance policy." [d. at 7\0. 
238. Proponents of the classical duty-to-read school often try to discredit those arguing for 
the objective theory by charging that their true goal is mindless one-sided boosterism for 
consumers and against business. See. e.g., Ware, supra note 3, at 1466 ("Advocates saw in the 
reasonable expectations doctrine a unifying principle that would resolve more cases in favor of 
the insured and would do so in an open and principled manner."). 
239. Confidence that negotiations will produce rational contract terms is highest in the 
idealized, perfectly competitive market. See Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 746-48. 
240. As long ago as 1884, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that "where the reason 
of a [contract] condition does not apply this court has refused to apply it." Grandin v. 
Rochester German Ins. Co., \07 Pa. 26, 37 (1884). 
241. Zuckerman v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 441. 445 (Ariz. 1982). 
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serves its valid purposes. The Arizona Supreme Court has held that a 
clause limiting the time for the filing of a cause of action is enforceable 
only if "the insurer has shown prejudice by reason of the delay in 
filing suit."242 The court reasoned that: 
The provision is not one which is bargained for and its application 
in the face of an otherwise valid claim defeats the reasonable cover-
age expectations of the insured; in the absence of prejudice to the 
insurer, caused by the late filing of suit, enforcement leads to an 
effectual forfeiture of the claim, thus creating an inequitable result. 
... Where the conditions do no more than provide a trap for 
the unwary, the insurer will be estopped to raise them. We thereby 
grant the consumer his reasonable expectation that coverage will 
not be defeated by the existence of provisions which were not nego-
tiated and in the ordinary case are unknown to the insured . . . . 
The clause will be enforced when the reasons for its existence are 
thereby served and will not be applied when to do so would be to 
defeat the basic intent of the parties in entering into the insurance 
transaction.243 
The California Supreme Court reasoned similarly when it 
examined a bank's six dollar charge for processing checks drawn on 
commercial accounts without sufficient funds to cover the checks 
(NSF checks).244 The depositor argued the fee was unconscionable 
because it was twenty times greater than the actual thirty cent cost to 
the bank for processing NSF checks.245 The court held that in order 
to determine the enforceability of the fee "inquiry into its basis or 
justification is necessary. "246 
242. [d. at 443, 448; accord Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1977); 
see also Jones v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 821 S.W.2d 798,801 (Ky. 1991) (holding that an 
insurer cannot withdraw coverage on the ground that a provision requiring prompt notification 
of an accident was not met, unless the insurer can show that it was prejudiced). 
243. Zuckerman, 650 P.2d at 447-48 (emphasis added); accord Burne v. Franklin Life Ins. 
Co., 301 A.2d 799, 803 (Pa. 1973) (holding that condition in life insurance policy limiting 
recovery to deaths occurring within 90 days from date of an accident was inapplicable where 
there was no dispute over cause of death); see also Jones v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 
670 P.2d 1305, 1312 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (construing insurance policy provision requiring 
an accident to be the "sole cause" of an injury as meaning the "dominant cause" of the injury); 
Smith v. Municipal Mut. Ins. Co., 289 S.E.2d 669, 671-72 (W. Va. 1982) (construing insurance 
contract provision stating that mailing is adequate notice, as requiring actual notice). 
244. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985). 
245. [d. at 512. 
246. [d. at 513. The court noted that "the bank charges the same fee whether it honors or 
rejects an NSF check. The fee, consequently, cannot be intended as compensation for the 
credit risk arising from paying such a check, or for the interest on the amount loaned." The 
court remanded the case so that the parties could present evidence on "the commercial setting, 
purpose, and effect" of the NSF charge. [d. at 514. See generally Capital Associates, Inc. v. 
Hudgens, 455 So. 2d 651, 653-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (striking as unconscionable an 
acceleration clause permitting jukebox lessor to recover $12,000 in unaccrued rent for 
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In C & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. ,247 the 
insured assumed he was covered when his warehouse was robbed. 
There were tire treads showing where the burglars used a truck to 
haul away goods. The insurance policy, though, provided coverage 
only if there were "visible marks made by tools, explosives, electricity 
or chemicals upon, or physical damage to, the exterior of the prem-
ises."248 The insurance company denied recovery because the only 
damage was to an interior door.249 The Iowa Supreme Court held 
that the purpose of the policy limitation was a "requirement of visual 
evidence (abundant here) indicating the burglary was an 'outside' not 
an 'inside' job."250 Because the evidence indicated an "outside" job, 
there was no legitimate reason strictly to enforce the provision against 
the insured. 
This analysis does not mean that the consumer always wins. If a 
form clause is appropriately tailored to fulfill its purpose, it should, 
and will, be enforced. For example, the Educational Testing Service 
(ETS) reserves, in its contract with those taking the Law School 
Admission Test, the unilateral right to cancel a test-taker's score upon 
suspicion of cheating.2S1 This was upheld because ETS's ability to 
cancel a score it reasonably believed did not reflect a candidate's apti-
tude for law school increased the test's predictive ability and thus 
served the legitimate interests of ETS, law schools, and the public in 
general,252 This was not viewed as an unfair, unbalanced clause. 
Because ETS offered the applicant the right to take a free retest with a 
commitment that, if the retest score was close, the original score 
would be reinstated, the form term was "eminently fair and reason-
able under the circumstances. "253 
Restricting the reach of overbroad terms in form contracts more 
accurately reflects the objective understanding of the consumer. 
Moreover, such restriction serves as an effective proxy for the face-to-
face negotiation envisioned by traditional contract law. 
equipment resold for $1,(00); Spring Valley Gardens Assoc. v. Earle, 447 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 
(Rockland County Ct. 1982) (striking $50 late fee for ten-day delay in paying $405 monthly 
residential rent). 
247. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). 
248. [d. at 171 (emphasis added). 
249. [d. 
250. [d. at 177. 
251. K.D. v. Educational Testing Serv., 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 (S. Ct. N.Y. County 1976). The 
provision was in a booklet presented to all LSAT takers and read, "We reserve the right to 
cancel any test score if, in our sole opinion, there is adequate reason to question the validity. 
Before exercising this right, we will offer you an opportunity to take the test again at no 
additional fee." [d. at 749. 
252. [d. at 752. 
253. [d. 
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C. The Information Exchanged 
Even in a form contract situation there is often communication 
between the parties. Statements are made by the seller, the seller's 
agent, or the consumer. Additionally, important information is often 
conveyed to consumers through mass advertising. This exchange of 
information contributes to the consumer's objective understanding of 
the contract. 254 
In Computerized Radiological Services, Inc. v. Syntex Corp. ,255 a 
group of radiologists purchased a CAT scanner.256 In order to close 
the deal, the seller promised that, although the current scanner only 
screened heads and took 60 seconds to scan, the capability to screen 
the entire body in 30 seconds would be available "shortly. "257 
Although these improvements were not forthcoming, the seller 
argued there was no breach of warranty because the one-year war-
ranty against defects provided for in the contract was "expressly in 
lieu of all other obligations or liabilities. "258 The judge held that the 
express warranty promised by the seller survived the disclaimer. The 
court stated that "[t]o agree with defendant that its boiler plate lan-
guage ... bars proof of express warranties made before plaintiff signed 
that form, would be to reweave the fabric of the agreement to suit 
defendant's own ends."259 
Statements by insurance agents also contribute to the insured's 
understanding of the fabric of the agreement. In Barr v. Allstate 
Insurance Co. ,260 an applicant for homeowner's and fire insurance 
254. For example, one court held that in-state students at the University of New 
Hamphshire who received letters informing them of the possibility of mid-semester tuition 
increases were bound by a contract term giving the University the right to increase tuition at 
any time, while out-of-state students who did not receive the mailing were not so bound: 
"Absent notice by the University of the potential increase, a reasonable student would not 
have anticipated additional charges for tuition to occur mid-semester." Gamble v. University 
Sys. of N.H., 610 A.2d 357, 362 (N.H. 1992). ' 
255. 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
256. The cost of the CAT (Computerized Axial Tomography) Scanner was $347,000. Id. at 
1500. 
257. Id. at 1501, 1506. 
258. Id. at 1506. 
259. Id. at 1507; see also U.C.C. § 2-313, cmt. 1 (1990) (stating that express warranties 
"rest on 'dickered' aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that 
bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basis of dickered terms."); 
Miller v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 62 P.2d 975, 977 (Okla. 1936) (stating that when an 
express oral warranty is contradicted by a written disclaimer, the buyer "may relabel his action 
as one in fraud and thus escape the parol evidence rule."); Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 
291 A.2d 858, 863 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1972) ("Where a party permits another to sign a 
contract knowing that he is under a misapprehension as to its terms, there is equitable fraud 
which warrants reformation or rescission."). 
260. 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969). 
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sought to include his business merchandise on his policy. Before leav-
ing on a trip, he telephoned his insurance agent and requested cover-
age for the merchandise. The agent replied, "Mr. Harr, we can cover 
you for $7500 and you arefully covered. Go to Florida ... and have a 
good time."261 While Mr. Harr was in Florida, disaster struck. Even 
though the merchandise was damaged by water from bursting pipes, 
which the language of the policy unambiguously excluded from cover-
age, the court ruled that the agent's statements were part of the 
contract: 
[W]here an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even though inno-
cently, the coverage of an insurance contract or the exclusions 
therefrom, to an insured before or at the inception of the contract, 
and the insured reasonably relies thereon to his ultimate detriment, 
the insurer is estopped to deny coverage after a loss on a risk or 
from a peril actually not covered by the terms of the policy. This 
proposition is one of elementary and simple justice. By justifiably 
relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the insured has been 
prevented from procuring the desired coverage elsewhere. To 
reject this approach ... would be an unfortunate triumph of form 
over substance.262 
The court recognized that this rule will impose new and possibly 
unintended risks on the insurer. Nonetheless, that too was equitable 
because: 
If the insurer is saddled with coverage it may not have intended or 
desired, it is of its own making, because of its responsibility for the 
acts and representations of its employees and agents. It alone has 
the capacity to guard against such a result by the proper selection. 
training and supervision of its representatives. 263 
Similarly, a seller has the capacity to guard against misrepresen-
tations in its advertisements that raise consumer expectations. In Col-
lins v. Uniroyal,264 tire advertisements provided a guarantee against 
blowouts stating, "[i]f it only saves your life once, it's a bargain."265 
261. [d. at 212. 
262. [d. at 219; see also Brown v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 818 S.W.2d I, 13 (Tenn. 1991) 
("Technical distinctions, created by the insurer within its field of expertise and exclusive 
control, should not dictate the fortunes of innocent insureds who reasonably rely upon the 
misrepresentations of agents of the insurer."). 
263. Barr, 255 A.2d at 219 (emphasis added); see also Brown, 818 S.W.2d at 13 ("[T]he 
insurer is in a better position to minimize the frequency of occasions in which the reasonable 
expectations of an insured are not supported by the policy language. By training its agents in 
the language of its policies, and by simplifying the policy language itself, the insurer can reduce 
the frequency of misrepresentations and increase the difficulty of proving reasonable 
reliance."); Peninsular Life Ins. Co. v. Wade, 425 So. 2d 1181, 1183-84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). 
264. 315 A.2d 16 (N.J. 1974). 
265. [d. at 18. 
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The estate of a purchaser, who was killed in an accident caused by a 
blowout, was permitted to sue for damages despite a contract clause 
limiting damages to replacement of the tire. 
The court stressed that the tire manufacturer's advertised state-
ments created an objective understanding that the manufacturer was 
assuming a far higher responsibility than normal: 
The seller should be held to realize that the purchaser of a tire 
buying it because so warranted is far more likely to have made his 
purchase decision in order to protect himself and the passengers in 
his car from death or personal injury in a blowout accident than to 
assure himself of a refund of the price of the tire in such an event. 
That being the natural reliance and reasonable expectation of the 
purchaser flowing from the warranty, it appears to us patently 
unconscionable for the manufacturer to be permitted to limit his 
damages . . . .266 
Statements made by the consumer prior to contracting are also 
relevant to the objective interpretation of form contracts because they 
contribute to the seller's understanding of the consumer's knowledge 
and purpose. Under the objective theory of form contracts, when a 
consumer's statements indicate a particular belief, the seller's silence 
can be viewed as acquiescence, regardless of written contractual lan-
guage to the contrary. 
Cases involving film processors' disclaimers of liability are an 
example of this principle. Film processors generally limit their liabil-
ity because "no film processor would expose itself to liability for the 
unknown content of film without having to so greatly increase the 
cost to the public as to price the service out of the market. "267 A 
Florida court upheld these limitations, but stressed that the consumer 
actually read and understood this clause. 
In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court refused to uphold a 
similar disclaimer of liability in Mieske v. Bartel Drug CO.268 A con-
sumer brought in thirty-two movie reels, covering many years of fam-
ily life, for splicing. She was given a receipt stating, "We assume no 
responsibility beyond retail cost of film unless otherwise agreed to in 
writing. "269 Although unaware of the clause, she said to the store 
266. Id. (emphasis added). 
267. Fotomat Corp. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). 
268. 593 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1979). A similar result, based on course of dealing, was reached 
in Karol v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 414 A.2d 939, 940 (N.H. 1980) (ignoring exclusion of 
film processing loss where film-maker asked insurer for "broad coverage" against film 
production losses). 
269. Mieske, 593 P.2d at 1310. 
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manager, "don't lose these. They are my life.'>27O After the store lost 
the film, the court upheld a jury verdict for $7,500. 
This is an appropriate result. The manager knew or should have 
known from the consumer's statement that she placed special value 
on the film and would hardly be satisfied with receiving twenty-five 
rolls of blank film or replacement. Once the manager knew of her 
special circumstances from her statements, he had an affirmative duty 
to inform her of the disclaimer of liability if he wished to retain the 
limitation.271 lethe manager feared losing the customer's business, he 
could have taken special precautions, perhaps for an added charge. 
The manager who knew of the special nature of the film, not the cus-
tomer who was unaware of the liability disclaimer, should suffer for 
the manager's silence. 
D. Beyond the Realm of Contemplation 
When parties negotiate a transaction, they focus on the central 
terms, such as price and quantity, and are likely aware of certain 
subordinate topics, such as warranty and credit terms. There are cer-
tain issues, however, that are so far removed from the purpose of the 
deal that they are not within the realm of contemplation of a party 
who neither drafted nor read the written contract. Just as one cannot 
accept an offer of which one is unaware,272 consumers should not be 
held to have objectively assented to such terms. 
In Weaver v. American Oil Co. ,273 the Indiana Supreme Court 
refused to enforce a term in a lease between an oil company and a 
filling station operator that not only held the oil company harmless 
for its own negligence, but actually required the operator to indemnify 
the oil company for damages caused by the oil company's negligence. 
The oil company did not contend that the operator knew of this term, 
or that he should have known he was assuming financial responsibility 
for the company's negligence. Rather, the company argued that the 
unread clause should control. The court refused to enforce the clause 
absent explicit agreement by both parties to the term. The court 
stated: "We do not mean to say or infer that parties may not make 
contracts exculpating one of his negligence and providing for indem-
nification, but it must be done knowingly and willingly as in insurance 
270.Id. 
271. Fotornot Corp., 464 So. 2d at 631 ("When the customer is made aware of the provision 
for limitation of liability and nevertheless proceeds with the transaction, he has assented to an 
agreement for which there is a commercial need . . . . "). 
272. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supro note 19, at 73. 
273. 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971). 
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contracts made for that purpose. "274 
A contract's subordinate clause permitting a bank to retain and 
use a mortgagor's prepaid interest and tax premiums without paying 
interest was struck down for similar reasons in Derenco, Inc. v. Benj. 
Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Association. 275 The court pointed 
out that approving a bank's interest-free use of the mortgagor's 
money would result in a "gratuitous windfall" because: 
[a]t the time of the making of the contract, there would have been 
no reason for borrowers to assume, in the absence of their being 
otherwise informed, that [the bank] would have any interest other 
than that which was necessary to accomplish the purpose of the 
deposits. 
[W]hen he is not paid interest nor told that deposited funds 
will be put to the institution's use, but instead is told that they will 
be put into a reserve account, we believe it is doubtful that he would 
expect the money to be used for the benefit of such institution.276 
Banks have long been relieved of the duty to pay a publicly 
announced reward to a samaritan who assists in the capture of a bank 
robber when she is unaware of the reward, because there "is no 
mutual agreement of the minds as is essential to a contract. "277 
There is similarly no mutual agreement of the minds as to contract 
provisions beyond the scope of the consumer's contemplation. 
Accordingly, form clauses disclaiming a residential landlord's implied 
warranty of habitability,278 imposing substantial liquidated damages 
274. [d. at 148. Interestingly enough, the court wrestled with the concept of objective, as 
opposed to subjective, assent: "The party seeking to enforce such a contract has the burden of 
showing that the provisions were explained to the other party and came to his knowledge and 
there was in fact a real and voluntary meeting 0/ the minds and not merely an objective 
meeting." [d. at 148. 
The court confused the "objective meeting" of the minds with a "legally imposed" 
meeting. The latter comes when the courts enforce an unknown clause, even though it was not 
contemplated by the consumer, because of a black-letter rule that signed contracts should be 
enforced as written. By contrast, the "objective" meeting of the minds over the indemnity 
clause never occurred in Weaver, as the court itself noted, because both the filling station 
operator was unaware of the term and the oil company knew that the operator's signature 
represented "a mere formality." [d. at 146. Although the court thought its holding violated 
the objective theory of contracts, in reality the decision enforces the objective understanding of 
the non-drafter's intent: "The law should seek the truth or the subjective understanding of the 
parties in this more enlightened age. The burden should be on the party submitting ... [the] 
printed form to show that the other party had knowledge of any unusual or unconscionable 
terms contained therein." [d. at 147. 
275. 577 P.2d 477 (Or. 1978). 
276. [d. at 488, 490 (emphasis added). 
277. Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 99 S.W. 1111, 1112 (Tex. 1907). 
278. See. e.g., Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 130 (W. Va. 1978) ("[I]t is fair to presume 
that no individual would voluntarily choose to live in a dwelling that,had become unsafe for 
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for default on a lease of farm equipment,279 and permitting a pawn-
broker to trespass on a borrower's property and intentionally (and 
tortiously) damage property280 have all been struck down. 
The underlying principle is that consumers should "not be intim-
idated or tricked ... by booby trap clauses hidden away in a printed 
form ... ."281 The further a form term is from the central purpose of 
the contract, the easier it should be for courts to find a lack of objec-
tive manifestation of assent by the consumer. 
IX. SPECIAL CASES 
While the range of possible form contract terms is virtually limit-
less, there are two areas that warrant special consideration under the 
objective theory. In the usual non-negotiated consumer form con-
tract, merger clauses and terms affecting the consumer's access to 
courts create an extraordinary risk of defeating the consumer's objec-
tive understanding. Moreover, the unexpectedly harsh effect of such 
clauses is so contrary to the average consumer's expectations that 
enforcement of the clauses may lead to great injustice. Accordingly, 
courts reviewing such clauses must take special care to interpret these 
clauses under the objective theory of contract. 
A. Merger Clauses 
A merger (or integration) clause purports to limit the contractual 
agreement to whatever terms appear on the document.282 When 
knowingly agreed upon, a merger clause serves to confirm each 
party's understanding of their respective obligations and helps courts 
in determining the intent of the parties.283 
In a typical consumer form contract, an unread merger clause 
not only fails to mirror the consumer's intent, but directly contradicts 
the understanding created by the merchant because it prevents prior 
statements from becoming part of the contract. For example, a sales-
person makes a promise to induce the consumer to enter into a con-
tract. The consumer reasonably relies on the statement and signs the 
contract. The unread merger clause defeats the consumer's reason-
human habitation.") (quoting Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1952»; see 
also Henroiulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 468-70 (Cal. 1978); Old Town 
Development Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 786-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). 
279. John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1574-75 (D. Kan. 1986). 
280. Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Mannix, 557 S.W.2d 755, 763 (Tex. 1977). 
281. Old Town Development Co., 349 N.E.2d at 785. 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77. 
283. See. e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 18, at 457-58. 
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able expectation created by the seller's statements.284 Not only is this 
unfair, but it also permits sellers to prevail despite their own knowl-
edge of the consumer's reliance on their statements in entering the 
contract. 
Following the teachings of Professor Corbin,z8s courts generally 
do not enforce consumer form merger clauses.286 In the words of the 
Washington Supreme Court, "a merger clause will not be enforced 
where it does not in fact express the true intentions of the parties."287 
For sellers who wish to avoid incorporating statements by their sales 
agents into the contract, the remedy is the proper selection, training, 
and supervision of sales agents and the adequate informing of 
consumers.288 
B. Access to Courts 
One broad area that is virtually never contemplated by consum-
ers signing form contracts is the selection of the legal forum and rules 
that will govern any future litigation. Consumers do not consider 
these matters because: 1) the consumer generally does not foresee the 
breakdown of the contract; 2) very few contracts in fact end in litiga-
tion; 3) there is no discussion at the time of contract, and certainly no 
advertisement, addressing these issues; and 4) many subtle legal issues 
are unknown and misunderstood by most laypersons.289 An unread 
term restricting consumers' access to judicial relief in case of breach 
of contract cannot be within their objective understanding of the 
agreement. Courts must ensure that enforcement of an unbalanced 
clause does not make the court itself a party to injustice. 
1. CONFESSIONS OF JUDGMENT 
A confession of judgment concedes liability on the part of the 
284. Seibel v. Layne & Bowler Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that "it 
would be unconscionable to permit an inconspicuous merger clause to exclude evidence of an 
express oral warranty"). 
285. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. 
286. See. e.g., Central Jersey Dodge Truck Ctr., Inc. v. Sightseer Corp., 608 F.2d 1106, 
1110 (6th Cir. 1979); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 595 P.2d 709,714 (Idaho 
1979); Rinaudo v. Bloom, 120 A.2d 184, 189 (Md. 1956); Seibel, 641 P.2d at 671. 
287. Berg v. Stromme, 484 P.2d 380, 385 (Wash. 1971). 
288. See. e.g., Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208, 219 (N.J. 1969). 
289. See John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PIIT. L. REV. I, 
74 (1969) (stating that "the pain and suffering of attempting to read and understand every 
printed form would be greater than the pain [suffered] as a result of occasionally being bound 
by unread and uncomprehended printed terms"); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract 
Law, 46 U. PIlT. L. REV. 75, 133 (1984) ("Because the vast majority of contracts are 
successfully completed, a reasonable consumer should pay little attention to the terms of a 
contract unless he values the contract highly or is alerted to potential problems."). 
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confessor prior to the alleged wrong-doing. The clause binds the 
signer to whatever charge the contract drafter chooses to levy, 
whether truthful or not. As one court stated: 
[T]he confession of judgment clause was the essence of a material, 
risk-shifting term. It was designed to summarily discard the due 
process guarantees which our system of jurisprudence so highly 
cherishes. It is difficult to conceive of a clause which alters risks in 
a more drastic fashion than one which dispenses with the signer's 
day in court.290 
The above quote is from a case where a wife signed two notes 
confessing judgment for monies her husband had embezzled from his 
employer.291 She was told at the signing that she would only be 
responsible for $160,000, which she knew her husband would be able 
to repay immediately.292 After the $160,000 was paid, the employer, 
citing the language of the second note, sued the wife for an additional 
$212,000.293 The court refused to enforce the second note because the 
wife 
did not understand the terms of the second judgment note. The 
harsh allocation of risk was not manifested in a manner reasonably 
comprehensible to her. She had never before seen a judgment note 
and was crying for part of the time when she read the documents 
presented to her, although she tried her best to read them. 294 
Confessions of judgment in form contracts are simply not 
expected. Moreover, the results of these terms are extraordinarily 
harsh. Without a consumer's knowing and voluntary assent to such 
terms, the drafter cannot reasonably believe that the consumer 
assented to the clause. As Professor Murray stated: 
Perhaps confession of judgment clauses are so pernicious that they 
should be declared illegal. In the absence of illegality, however, 
the only concern of the court should be whether the party against 
whom the clause is supposed to operate knew about it and, once his 
apparent assent is manifested, whether he had any choice at all in 
relation to it, i.e., whether his apparent assent was genuine.29s 
2. A ITORNEY FEES 
Another pernicious clause frequently found in form contracts 
requires the consumer to pay the attorney fees of the contract drafter. 
290. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
291. [d. at 140. 
292. [d. 
293. [d. 
294. [d. at 147. 
295. Murray, supra note 289, at 19-20. 
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The requirement to pay the other party's attorney fees for litigation 
over the contract, whose obligation has not yet been performed let 
alone breached, is not within the consumer's contemplation. Such a 
term should never be enforced absent knowing and genuine assent by 
the consumer. 
Courts have long recognized the harmful effects of such clauses. 
In 1892, the Supreme Court of North Carolina refused to enforce a 
clause in a promissory note stipulating that "in case this note is col-
lected by legal process the usual collection fee shall be due. "296 The 
court stated that "such a provision is a stipulation for a penalty or 
forfeiture, tends to the oppression of the debtor and to encourage liti-
gation, is a cover for usury, is without any valid consideration to sup-
port it, contrary to public policy, and void."297 
This tendency to oppress inherent in fee clauses is well-illustrated 
by the case in which a New York City landlord, after losing the case, 
attempted to collect attorney fees from a tenant. 298 The court denied 
recovery, stating that "[a]n award of counsel fees to a non-prevailing 
party would be an absurd and oppressive result. "299 The landlord was 
also denied attorney fees for the administrative hearings at which he 
prevailed. The court stated that "[t]he threat of onerous attorneys' 
fees in the event of an adverse determination might well have a chil-
ling effect upon parties taking their grievance to the administrative 
body expressly established to adjudicate those grievances. "300 
Short of simply refusing to enforce form attorney fee clauses, the 
New York legislature may have created the best alternative for com-
mon law courts. New York State law now requires that where a lease 
provides for recovery of legal fees by a prevailing landlord, a tenant 
who prevails will also be eligible for attorney fees.30' 
In a consumer form contract, attorney fee provisions are far from 
the contemplation of the non-drafting party. The best response to 
such a provision would be to find it unenforceable because of the lack 
of objective manifestation of assent. 302 Alternatively, prevailing con-
296. Tinsley v. Hoskins, 16 S.E. 325, 325 (N.C. 1892). 
297. [d. (quoting Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Sevier, 14 F. 662, 663 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1882». 
298. East 55th St. Joint Venture v. Litchman, 469 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1983), 
affd, 487 N.Y.S.2d 256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
299. [d. at 1018. 
300. 487 N.Y.S.2d at 258. 
301. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 234 (McKinney 1989 and 1993 Supp.). 
302. One example of an attorney fee clause that was subject to true assent was the promise 
by the owners of major league baseball teams to pay for the former baseball commissioner's 
attorney fees in case of litigation between the owners and the commissioner. Jim Hennem~, 
Owners Seem Prepared to Knock Vincent Out 0/ Commission, BALTIMORE MORNING SUN, 
Sept. 3, 1992, at D6. 
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sumers should be permitted to recover attorney fees whenever prevail-
ing sellers would. Otherwise, intimidation and litigation is 
encouraged without gain for true freedom of contract. 
3. JURY TRIAL 
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides the right to a jury trial in civil litigation.303 . One court stated 
that "[t]his is a valuable, cherished right; it is integral to our system of 
justice. "304 While this right can be waived, the relinquishment must 
be knowing and voluntary. 305 
Form contracts should not surreptitiously wrest away a right 
granted by the framers of the Constitution. As one court stated: 
[Drafters] have a very heavy burden of proving that the plaintiffs 
knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally agreed upon the jury 
waiver provision . . . . A constitutional guarantee so fundamental 
as the right to jury trial cannot be waived unknowingly by mere 
insertion of a waiver provision on the twentieth page of a twenty-
two page standardized form contract .... In fact, the defendants 
have failed to show that the plaintiffs had any choice other than to 
accept the contract as written .... Absent proof to the contrary, 
such an inequality in relative bargaining positions suggests that the 
asserted waiver was neither knowing nor intentional. 306 
The Alabama Supreme Court similarly refused to enforce a jury 
trial waiver in a form contract between a pharmacist and his 
employer, a department store, because "it does not appear that the 
waiver ... was intelligently or knowingly made."307 An unread form 
303. U.s. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, ... the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved .... "). 
304. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982). 
305. See, e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that waiver must be "done knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally"); National Equip. Rental, 
Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[T]he Seventh Amendment right to a jury is 
fundamental and ... its protection can only be relinquished knowingly and intelligently."). 
For a discussion of waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, see Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 
777, 788 (W.O. Mich. 1975) ("[A] blanket authorization in an adhesion contract that the 
College may search the room for violation of whatever substantive regulations the College 
chooses to adopt and pursuant to whatever search regulation the College chooses to adopt is 
not the type of focused, deliberate, and immediate consent contemplated by the 
Constitution."); cf Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (holding unenforceable 
contractual provision waiving due process rights when there was "no showing whatever that 
the appellants were actually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now 
relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights."). 
306. Dreiling, 539 F. Supp. at 403 (refusing to enforce a jury trial waiver in a contract 
between an automobile manufacturer and a dealer). 
307. Gaylord Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 587 (Ala. 1981). The court 
described the contract as a "form contract with boiler plate provisions. The jury waiver 
provision is buried in paragraph thirty-four in a contract containing forty-six paragraphs .... " 
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contract clause does not evince a knowing and willing waiver of the 
Constitutional right to trial by jury. Consequently, courts should be 
leary of enforcing such clauses absent concrete objective evidence of 
the consumer's assent. 
4. ARBITRATION 
Arbitration can be an efficient and economical means for resolv-
ing disputes. The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act308 "establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration, requiring 
that '[a court] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.' "309 Thus, 
the Court has upheld form terms in brokerage contracts that required 
arbitration of claims relating to S.E.C. Act violations,310 antitrust 
laws,3tl and RICO suits.312 
The Supreme Court, however, has not issued an opinion on 
unread form arbitration clauses. The Court has not stated that arbi-
tration clauses are more easily enforceable than other contract 
clauses, merely that they should not be especially disfavored.313 In a 
similar vein, the Court held that the Arbitration Act reflects Con-
gress's intent to make "arbitration agreements as enforceable as other 
contracts, but not more SO."314 Thus, if other unread form contract 
[d.; see also Fairfield Leasing Corp. v. Techni-Graphics, Inc., 607 A.2d 703, 705 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1992) ("A constitutional guarantee so fundamental as the right to jury trial 
cannot be waived unknowingly by mere insertion of a waiver provision on the twentieth page 
of a twenty-two page standardized form contract."). A form jury waiver was enforced, 
however, when the non-drafter was represented by counsel who read the form prior to signing. 
Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
308. 9 U.S.C. § I (1988). Section 2 reads: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
309. Shearson/ American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citations 
omitted). 
310. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
311. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
312. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 242. 
313. Absent a well-founded claim that an arbitration agreement resulted from the 
sort of fraud or excessive economic power that 'would provide grounds for the 
revocation of any contract,' the Arbitration Act 'provides no basis for disfavoring 
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable 
inquiry into arbitrability. ['] 
[d. at 226 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
627 (1985». 
314. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404 n.12 (1967). The 
Court added that courts were not barred from reviewing whether arbitration clauses were 
fraudulently procured, because to "immunize an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge 
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clauses are struck down under the objective theory, unread arbitration 
clauses should meet a similar fate. 
In fact, the Supreme Court seems willing to accept such a con-
tention. In upholding a brokerage form arbitration agreement, the 
Court stated, "Although petitioners suggest that the agreement to 
arbitrate here was adhesive in nature, the record contains no factual 
showing sufficient to support that suggestion."31S The Court did not 
say it was irrelevant whether the contract was adhesive, merely that 
conclusory statements to that effect are insufficient to attack an arbi-
tration clause. The clear implication is that if such a factual showing 
of adhesion had been made, the arbitration clause would have been 
treated quite differently.316 
For example, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a medical 
clinic's arbitration clause was unenforceable because the clinic did not 
explain it to the patient. 317 Relying on the objective theory of con-
tracts, the court stated that the patient "did not give an informed con-
sent to the agreement and that no meeting of the minds occurred."318 
Even if a patient does read an arbitration clause, depending on 
the circumstances, the reading alone may not constitute sufficient evi-
dence of a meeting of the minds. Especially when the form is 
presented to a patient just before a medical procedure is to begin, 
courts should be reluctant to find objective assent.319 
on the ground of fraud in the inducement would be to elevate it over other forms of contract." 
Id. 
315. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) 
(emphasis added). 
316. While the Court did not say precisely what sort of factual showing would be sufficient, 
its appreciation of the problem is apparent. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (stating "courts should remain attuned to well-
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or 
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any 
contract.' "). 
317. Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985). 
318. Id.; see also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 174 (Cal. 1966) (stating that 
arbitration provisions were contrary to the reasonable expectation of the non-drafting party, 
absent "plain and clear" notification of the existence of such clauses); Sanchez v. Sirmons, 467 
N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) ("In order to be binding, the arbitration provision 
should have been called to the petitioner's attention and she should have been given a 
reasonable explanation of its meaning and effect, including an explanation of any other 
available options."); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 325 N.W.2d 435,438 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982) (agreement to arbitrate must be made "in an intelIigent, knowing and voluntary 
manner"). 
319. It is only the unusual patient who faces surgery without fear and trepidation. 
The anxiety produced by thoughts of soon entering the operating room, an 
unfamiliar setting, and the ever present possibility of an untoward result, create 
an inappropriate atmosphere in which to thrust upon a patient for the first time 
the burden of analyzing documents containing an arbitration provision 
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Even if arbitration was reasonably expected by the non-drafting 
party,320 neither the arbitration provision nor the arbitration tribunal 
must favor the contract drafter.321 A one-sided arbitration provision 
gives only one party the right to demand arbitration. For example, a 
physician's contract required that all claims arising from the doctor-
patient relationship be arbitrated, except claims for money due for 
services rendered. 322 Because only doctors might have a claim for 
payment for their services, the court refused to enforce the arbitration 
clause and stated: "An arbitration agreement will not be enforced 
unless it is 'mutually binding.' Where an arbitration clause is not 
mutually binding, but rather grants one party a unilateral right to 
arbitrate, the court will not enforce such agreement."323 
To be enforceable, an arbitration clause must also place the deci-
sion in the hands of an impartial arbiter who is neither personally nor 
institutionally biased. The California Supreme Court acknowledged 
that contracting parties could agree to select non-neutral arbitrators, 
but absent equal bargaining and true consent, required that any arbi-
tration must meet "minimum levels of integrity."324 
inconspicuously embodied therein. A patient being wheeled into the operating 
room should not have to contemplate the pros and cons of litigating the 
surgeon's mistakes before a tribunal of arbitrators rather than before a jury in a 
court of law. 
Sanchez, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 761; see also Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 
447 (Cal. 1963) ("The admission room of a hospital contains no bargaining table where, as in a 
private business transaction, the parties can debate the terms of their contract. "). 
320. See. e.g., Preston v. Kruezer, 641 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Finkle & Ross 
v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hope v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds Org., Inc., 226 Cal. Rptr. 439, 445-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
321. See. e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976) (upholding 
arbitration clause that "bears equally" on both parties). 
322. Miner v. Walden, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). 
323. [d. at 339; accord Mendes v. Automobile Ins. Co., 563 A.2d 695, 699 (Conn. 1989) 
(rejecting clause limiting appeals); Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992) 
(striking clause authorizing appeal of only high arbitration awards); Schmidt v. Midwest 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Minn. 1988) (same); Pepin v. American 
Universal Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 21, 23 (R.1. 1988) (same); see also Dwyer v. Biddle, 83 N.Y.S.2d 
138, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) ("There is no satisfactory showing of a reciprocally 
enforceable written contract of the parties containing the claimed arbitration clause. "). 
324. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981). 
[W]e must note that when as here the contract designating such an arbitrator is 
the product of circumstances suggestive of adhesion, the possibility of 
overreaching by the dominant party looms large; contracts concluded in such 
circumstances, then, must be scrutinized with particular care to insure that the 
party of lesser bargaining power, in agreeing thereto, is not left in a position 
depriving him of any realistic and fair opportunity to prevail in a dispute under 
its terms. 
[d. Thus, the court refused to order arbitration which would have been conducted by the 
union of one of the contracting parties. [d. at 177. 
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5. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES 
Contracting parties sometimes try to control the costs of future 
litigation by including a term requiring that all litigation be filed in a 
designated forum. 32s These forum selection clauses serve to prevent 
future conflicts regarding the correct forum and permit a rational 
business to consolidate legal action in one locale. 326 
The major danger inherent in these clauses is that they can force 
consumers to enforce their rights in far removed fora, which may 
effectively bar such enforcement. As one court said, such a clause 
represents a recurring fantasy of shipowners and cargo defense 
lawyers. Ideally, if a choice of forum clause in a bill of lading 
would name the place for the resolution of the controversy, for 
example, Timbuktu or Byelorussia, then the expense and discom-
fort of pursuing the matter there would, of course, affect the exer-
cise of the rights of the otherwise innocent cargo owner. Certain 
claims, because of the amount involved or other considerations 
regarding evidence and witnesses would not be pursued. 327 
In Paragon Homes Inc. v. Carter,328 a Maine corporation, doing 
home improvements on a house in Brockton, Massachusetts, inserted 
into its form contract a clause designating New York as the proper 
forum. 329 The New York courts refused to enforce the clause, stating 
that the clause 
was inserted by the plaintiff in its printed form of contract for the 
purpose of harassing and embarrassing the defendants in the prose-
cution or defense of any action arising thereunder. This is not a 
case involving parties situated on an equal basis .... The procure-
ment of defendants' consent to New York as the forum for legal 
redress is . . . without justification, grossly unfair and 
unconscionable.330 
By contrast, the United States Supreme Court upheld a forum 
selection clause in a consumer form contract in Carnival Cruise Lines 
v. Shute. 331 Consumers from the state of Washington had purchased, 
through a local travel agent, tickets for a cruise from California to 
325. Some courts hold that choice of law clauses should be treated the same as those 
designating choice of forum. Sembawang Shipyard, Ltd. v. Charger, Inc., 955 F.2d 983, 986 
(5th Cir. 1992). 
326. For an excellent discussion of forum selection clauses, see Goldman, supra note 3. 
327. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. MIV "Steir", 773 F. Supp. 523, 524 n.l (D.P.R. 
1991). 
328. Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 295 N.Y.S.2d 
606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968). 
329. Id. at 818. 
330. Id. 
331. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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Mexico. The tickets contained a forum selection clause designating 
Florida, the location of the cruise line's corporate headquarters, as the 
forum. 332 Ms. Shute suffered an injury while sailing in international 
waters, and she sued the cruise line in Washington upon her return. 
The Supreme Court upheld the forum selection clause, stating that it 
had not been inserted into a form contract merely to discourage litiga-
tion.333 Instead, the selection of Florida was a good faith selection 
given that the cruise line's principal place of business was Florida and 
that many of its cruises left from Florida. Moreover, because a ship 
carries passengers from many locales, the cruise line might rationally 
wish to consolidate all potential claims in a single site. 334 
One factor limiting the precedential scope of Carnival in future 
consumer form cases is that the cause of action occurred in interna-
tional waters.335 Unlike the situation where consumers purchase 
goods for use in their homes, the cruise occurred far from either 
party's domicile. The forum selection clause was especially appropri-
ate in that situation "given the fact that Mrs. Shute's accident 
occurred off the coast of Mexico-[this dispute was not] an essentially 
local one inherently more suited to resolution in the State of Washing-
ton than in Florida. "336 
The Court also concluded that, even though this was a form con-
tract over which there had been no bargaining, there were no contrac-
tual irregularities to defeat enforcement of the term. 337 The Court 
deliberately declined to address the most important issue in interpret-
ing form contracts, whether consumers are truly aware of subordinate 
provisions of such contracts. 
The reason for this omission is that the consumers in their brief 
expressly waived any contention that they had not received adequate 
notice of the clause: "The respondents do not contest the incorpora-
tion of the provision nor that the forum selection clause was reason-
332. Clause 8 stated: 
It is agreed by and between the passenger and the Carrier that all disputes and 
matters whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract 
shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a Court located in the State of Florida, 
U.S.A., to the exclusion of the Courts of any other state or country. 
[d. at 587-88. 
333. [d. at 595. 
334. [d. 
335. "We begin by noting the boundaries of our inquiry. First, this is a case in admiralty, 
and federal law governs the enforceability of the forum-selection clause we scrutinize." [d. at 
590. 
336. [d. at 594. 
337. "Common sense dictates that a ticket of this kind will be a form contract the terms of 
which are not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have 
bargaining parity with the cruise line." [d. at 593. 
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ably communicated to the respondents, as much as three pages of fine 
print can be communicated. The issue is whether the forum selection 
clause should be enforced, not whether Respondents received the 
ticket."338 The apparent irony of the phrase "as much as three pages 
of fine print can be communicated" was ignored by the Supreme 
Court, which took this admission at face value: "[W]e do not address 
the question whether respondents had sufficient notice of the forum 
clause before entering the contract for passage. Respondents essen-
tially have conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection provi-
sion. "339 Therefore, the Court explicitly declined to consider the issue 
of the adequacy of Carnival Cruise Lines' disclosure of the forum 
selection term. 
Carnival does not stand for the proposition that mere inclusion 
of a term in a form contract amounts to adequate notice. The con-
sumers here conceded notice, and the Supreme Court merely took 
them for their word. The district court in Generale Bank v. 
Choudhury340 therefore misread Carnival when it asserted that an 
undisclosed form term which "could have been read" was "reason-
ably communicated" to consumers. 341 The lower court upheld the 
forum selection clause in a promissory note, even though the debtor 
argued he did not have notice of the clause. The court stated that the 
debtor signed the promissory notes, and that he "could have been 
made aware of the forum-selection clause had he read those docu-
ments."342 The court erroneously concluded that Carnival mandated 
that "[g]iven that the forum-selection clause was 'reasonably commu-
nicated' to Choudhury through delivery of the promissory notes 
which he signed, Choudhury had constructive notice of that 
338. Brief for Respondents at 26, Carnival Cruise Lines (No. 89-1647). This was a tactical 
decision [in hindsight, a poor one], as they chose to focus their legal energies on arguing that 
the unequal bargaining power was sufficient to defeat enforcement of the forum selection 
clause. In fairness, this strategy did work in the Court of Appeals, where the Ninth Circuit 
stated: "Even if we assume that the Shutes had notice of the provision, there is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the Shutes could have bargained over this language." 897 F.2d 377, 389 
(9th Cir. 1990). The appellate court did say this assumption was "doubtful," because the 
consumers did not have the opportunity to review the terms until mailed to them, id. at 389 
n.ll, but proceeded on this "doubtful" contention anyway. 
339. 499 U.S. at 590. The admission of having read the contract was counter-factual, as 
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that "only the most meticulous passenger is likely to become 
aware of the forum selection provision." Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The term was 
included as the eighth of twenty-five numbered paragraphs, on a form which was not delivered 
until consumers had already purchased their ticket, and which barred refunds for those who 
wished to get out of the deal. Id. 
340. 779 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
341. Id. at 305 n.1. 
342. Id. at 305. 
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clause. "343 
The Supreme Court did not adopt the principle of "constructive 
notice." The significance of Carnival for determining the enforceabil-
ity of form terms in general is far more narrow. The Court stressed 
that its holding should be read in light of two limiting facts: the non-
local nature of the dispute and the fact that the consumers did "not 
claim lack of notice of the forum clause. "344 Therefore, as in the arbi-
tration cases,345 the Supreme Court has indicated that cases by con-
sumers who were unaware of specific form terms are distinguishable 
from cases where consumers admit notice. Before enforcing an 
unread form forum-selection clause, courts should apply the objective 
theory of contract and insist on a showing that the consumer was 
aware of the clause and its effects. 
One pre-Carnival court explicitly referred to this concept in 
refusing to enforce a forum selection clause in a farmer's lease of 
water drilling equipment.346 The court transferred the case to Wash-
ington, where the transaction had occurred, despite the clause select-
ing New York as the forum and stated "[t]here was absolutely 
nothing about these transactions which could alert reasonable persons 
that disputes arising out of the agreements would be adjudicated 
3,000 miles away in New York."347 In a particularly appropriate 
application of the objective theory, the court stated: "[i]f the finder of 
fact determines that [the non-drafter] did not know of the lease's pro-
visions, and that they were not brought to his attention, ... he might 
not be bound by those provisions to which he did not assent-i. e. on 
which the parties' minds did not meet."348 
X. CONCLUSION 
The classical common law presumption that consumers read 
form contracts has led both to injustice and to an irrational bifurca-
tion of contract law. Modem courts have attempted to correct this 
misstep by adhering to the fundamental principle that a consumer's 
assent to a contract should be determined by how a reasonable person 
343. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
344. Carnival, 499 U.S. at 595 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the Court again 
stressed the consumer's concession: "Finally, respondents have conceded that they were given 
notice of the forum provision and, therefore, presumably retained the option of rejecting the 
contract with impunity." Id. 
345. See supra text accompanying notes 315-16. 
346. Leasing Servo Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
347. Id. at 369. 
348. Id. at 366 n.3 (emphasis added). 
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in the other party's position would ascertain the consumer's intent as 
manifested through words and deeds. 
Accordingly, we can now see the outline of the objective theory 
of consumer form contracts. Courts no longer assume that the 
unknown subordinate written terms are automatically assented to 
merely because they are included in an executed contract. Rather, 
courts should examine both what the consumer actually knew and 
what knowledge is properly attributable to the consumer. 
Courts applying the objective theory should examine what con-
tract terms were actually negotiated or explained. Next, courts must 
explore the purpose for which the product or service is being 
acquired, the legitimate purposes for which subordinate clauses were 
included, the content of the communication between the consumer 
and the salesperson, and the effect of mass advertisements. Finally, 
courts must consider which topics were likely beyond the scope of the 
consumer's contemplation. 
This correction of a misdirected common law rule is consistent 
with the role of common law courts. As Benjamin Cardozo 
explained: 
A rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves, 
and was supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, 
may be abrogated by the courts when the mores have so changed 
that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to the social con-
science .... This is not usurpation. It is not even innovation. It is 
the reservation for ourselves of the same power of creation that 
built up the common law through its exercise by the judges of the 
past. 349 
The creation of a new rule for form contracts is at hand. If accu-
rately applied, the objective theory will both end the unnatural 
growth of divergent contractual theories and permit true freedom of 
contract. 
349. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, The Growth of the Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO; THE CHOICE OF TVCHO BRAHE 185,246 (Margaret E. Hall 
ed., 1947). 
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ApPENDIX 
KARL LLEWELLYN'S UNPUBLISHED 1941 FIRST DRAFT OF 
REVISION TO THE UNIFORM SALES ACT: (section on 
form contracts) 
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SECTION I-C. (New to Sales Act.) DECLARATION OF POLICY, 
AND PROCEDURE WITH REGARD TO DISPLACEMENT OF 
SINGLE PROVISIONS OR GROUPS OF 
PROVISIONS BY AGREEMENT. 
(1) (a) The principles declared in this Act represent a fair and bal-
anced allocation of rights and liabilities between parties to sales and 
contracts to sell, as such allocation has been developed out of the best 
case-law and mercantile practice to cover each point to which the two 
parties have not directed their careful and deliberate attention. 
(b) When both the parties have so directed their attention to a 
particular point that the coverage of that point in a manner in addi-
tion to or at variance from this Act may fairly be regarded as the 
deliberate desire of both, and as reflecting a considered bargain on 
that particular point, the provision of the contract on that point is 
called in this Act a "particularized term of the bargain"; and the legis-
lature recognizes that policy in general requires the parties' particular 
bargain to control. Wherever a provision of the Act is not subject to 
such modification by agreement, or is subject to such modification 
only within stated limits, that fact is expressly stated in the Act. 
(c) The legislature also recognizes that particular trades and sit-
uations often require extensive special regulation in a manner depart-
ing from the general provisions of this Act, and that speed and 
convenience in transacting business may require such extensive depar-
tures to be incorporated into a general form-contract, or into "rules" 
to which particular transactions are made subject, although the 
details of such "rules" or forms are not so deliberated on and bar-
gained about by the two parties when they are closing an individual 
transaction as to become particularized terms of the bargain. 
(d) On the other hand, the legislature recognizes that where a 
group or bloc of provisions are not studied and bargained about in 
detail by both parties, then actual assent to the incorporation of such 
a group or bloc into a particular transaction is not in fact to be 
assumed where the group or bloc of provisions, taken as a whole, allo-
cates rights and obligations in an unreasonably unfair and unbalanced 
fashion. The legislature recognizes that assent, without deliberation 
and bargaining, to the incorporation into a transaction of a group or 
bloc of provisions varying from the general law rests upon the presup-
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position that such a group or bloc of provisions will prove to be a 
reasonably fair and balanced one; and the legislature recognizes that 
this holds true in fact, whether or not such a group or bloc of provi-
sions are printed upon the contract-form used, and whether or not a 
formal recital of acceptance of such a group or bloc of provisions is 
found thereon. 
(e) The policy of the legislature is to aid and foster any consid-
ered and deliberate action to the parties, or of representatives of the 
parties' interests, in substituting for the general rules of this Act a fair 
and balanced set of provisions more particularly fitted to the needs of 
any particular trade or type of situation. The policy of the legislature 
is also to avoid any seeming portion of a bargain which does not truly 
represent bargaining, but under which one party seeks to displace the 
rules of this Act without particular deliberation and bargaining over 
each clause, in favor of a set of provisions which lack reasonable bal-
ance and fairness in their allocation of rights and obligations. 
(2) (a) It is therefore the declared policy of the legislature that where 
a number of points purport to be covered in bloc bY'a transaction, as 
by a form-contract, or by reference to a set of "rules", and a number 
of the provisions concerned are at variance with the provisions of this 
Act, then the circumstances of the case shall determine whether the 
bloc of provisions is or is not substituted as such for the provisions of 
the Act. It is the declared policy that the court shall examine the bloc 
of provisions in the light of the situation. 
(i) If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to work 
a displacement or modification of the provisions of this Act 
in an unfair and unbalanced fashion not required by the cir-
cumstances of the trade, then the party claiming application 
of any particular provision in such bloc must show that the 
other party, with due knowledge of the contents of that par-
ticular provision, intended that provision to displace or 
modify the relevant provision of this Act in regard to the 
particular transaction. 
(ii) If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to 
work a fair and balanced allocation of rights and duties in 
view of the circumstances of the trade, its incorporation into 
the particularized terms of the bargain is presumed from the 
presence of the bloc of provisions or of a clear incorporation 
thereof on the document of contract. 
(iii) If no affirmative showing is made either way, then 
the whole bloc of provisions may be incorporated into the 
transaction by any circumstance which would justify treat-
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ing a single provision as one of the particularized terms of 
the bargain. 
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(b) The question under this subsection is for the court [or for a 
special merchants' jury under Section 51-C.] 
(c) In weighing fair balance and in weighing particular intention, 
the court may properly consider the circumstances of preparation of 
any contract-form, or set of "rules", and, in particular 
(i) whether both buyers and sellers of the type involved 
in the particular transaction have had a voice in such prepa-
ration; and 
(ii) whether the displacement of provisions of this Act 
sought by the form or "rules" as a whole runs dispropor-
tionately in favor of one party as against the other. 
(iii) whether clauses sought to be substituted for provi-
sions of this Act are in consonance with fair expectation, in 
the light of the circumstances of the trade. 
• • • 
COMMENT ON SECTION I-C. 
A. General. 
This section undertakes to clarify one of the most confused situa-
tions in the law of the field, while doing justice to each line of known 
need. 
(1) The balanced "Association" type of "Rules". General provi-
sions in an Act cannot do particular justice to the particular condi-
tions of the wholesale trade in grain, or furs, or dried fruit, or fresh 
produce. What general provisions can do, is to leave usage of trade 
free to modify or displace the general provisions. But proof of usage 
of trade, especially before a jury, is expensive and uncertain. Even 
before a jury of merchants, the results of proof of such usage of trade 
must abide the event, and some upsets are inevitable. Moreover, 
usage may be unclear, or in process of change, or different as between 
the market the seller knows and the market familiar to the buyer. It 
is, therefore, wisdom for those engaged in a particular trade to get 
together on a clear and specialized articulate statement in advance of 
such usages or changes in usage as they wish incorporated into their 
transactions. This the section recognizes and seeks to encourage. 
(2) The 'Jug-handled" type of "Rules" or form. A private codifi-
cation, however, has dangers. It may heap all the advantages sought 
on one side, and heap all the burdens on the other. And this has 
proved true not only of many form-contracts prepared by single sell-
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ers (or buyers), but also of "rules" prepared by groups, when it hap-
pened that the interests or thinking of the group ran predominantly to 
one single side of the sales transaction. 
(3) The principle of freedom of bargain is a principle of freedom 
of intended bargain. It requires what the parties' have bargained out 
to stand as the parties have shaped it, subject only to certain overrid-
ing rules of public policy. "Written" bargains, in the days when the 
rules about them crystallized, were bargains whose detailed terms the 
two parties had looked over; and the rule was proper, that a signature 
meant agreement. When, however, parties bargain today, they think 
and talk of such matters as price, credit, date of delivery, description 
and quantity. These are the bargained terms. The unmentioned 
background is assumed without mention to be the fair and balanced 
general law and the fair and balanced usage of the particular trade. 
Displacement of these balanced backgrounds is not to be assumed as 
intended unless deliberate intent is shown that they shall be displaced; 
and deliberate intent is not shown by a lop-sided form whose very 
content suggests that it has not been carefully read, and the circum-
stances of whose execution suggest that the matters under discussion 
and consideration were only the matters written or typed in. 
(4) The courts have groped for a guide through these two situa-
tions, being bothered by an assumed need for a single rule which 
would either inClude even the most lop-sided form, or else would 
exclude even the fairest one, when the parties had not given particular 
and deliberate attention to its incorporation. Some of the earlier cases 
in which lop-sided forms produced shock were dealt with in part on 
principles of public utilities (the clauses freeing the railroad from its 
own negligence, or limiting the telegraph company's liability; the bag-
gage-check clauses). More recently, in addition to sometimes strained 
construction "against the party preparing the document", court after 
court has given expression to the desire for balance by requiring, over 
and above what is needed to make out consideration, some type of 
further "mutuality" in the expressed obligation. 
(5) The true principle is clear enough: the expression of a body 
of fair and balanced usage is a great convenience, a gain in clarity and 
certainty, an overcoming of the difficulty faced by the law in regulat-
ing the multitude of different trades; on the other hand, the substitu-
tion of private rule-making by one party, in his own interest, for the 
balance provided by the law, is not to be recognized without strong 
reason shown. This is the result in accordance with which the best 
case-law has moved, in many individual cases, but without the coher-
ent general formulation here provided. 
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(6) The one-sided group of clauses which are fair, but are needed 
to give protection against bad law. 
Many groups of clauses in very frequent use in the Sales field are 
utterly one-sided, but are, for all that, entirely fair because they cor-
rect in a reasonable wayan unfortunate condition of the law. The 
most frequent of these are seller's clauses protecting against various 
types of business impossibility, and protecting against the obligation 
of delivery on credit to a buyer who has become a dubious risk. Such 
groups of clauses give no difficulty under the present Act, however; 
for the Act explicitly recognizes the impossibility clauses and provides 
the requisite balance to them in Section 50; and it explicitly recognizes 
the propriety of either party's desire for security against uncertainty 
of performance, in Section 45. In addition, any coverage by contract 
which appeals to the court as producing reasonable balance in matters 
not covered by the Act-such as, for instance, reasonable priority or 
rationing provisions in regard to outstanding commitments-would 
require to be regarded as pro tanto crystallizations of entirely reason-
able trade practice or need. See paragraph 2 (c) (iii). 
(7) Will such a provision produce uncertainty in the construction 
of contracts in Sales transactions? 
There are two compelling reasons for the conviction that such a 
provision will not produce uncertainty in the construction of Sales 
transactions. 
(a) It will not produce uncertainty, because there is uncertainty. 
It is at the present moment impossible to tell what a court will do 
with a contested provision in a lop-sided Sales contract. Draftsmen 
have to draft on a gamble. 
(b) It will lessen the existing uncertainty, because it gives the 
draftsman a reasonable guidance as to what he may reasonably expect 
to sustain, and gives the court a reasonable guidance through the con-
fused and conflicting precedents. 
In addition, the provision may fairly be hoped, over the years, to 
lessen uncertainty not only in court, but in transactions, by encourag-
ing the reduction of trade usage to written form. But the case for the 
provision stands not on this, but on the bewildering uncertainty which 
exists today as to when a court will read one-party language as it is 
written, and when it will find a way to avoid such language. 
B. Detail. 
(1) Legislative Finding of Fact and Declaration of Policy. 
(a) The finding of fact and declaration of policy are, 
historically, almost an inherent part of statutes; their desue-
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tude for a period was due in good part to their abuse. But 
when not abused, they have peculiar value. 
(b) For from the technical standpoint they are inherent 
in a statute. It is humanly impossible to construe a statute 
without envisaging some situation to which the statute is 
conceived to be addressed; and it is also humanly impossible 
without envisaging a purpose or a set of purposes toward 
which the statute is directed. 
The situation and the purposes thus have to be set up, 
either by the legislature or by the court. If they are left to be 
gathered by the court as best it can gather or imagine them, 
different courts are likely to see them differently. Both the 
need for uniformity and the need for clarity urge that the 
situation and the purposes be stated with care, to guide all 
lawyers and courts alike. 
No less is the general relation between the Act and sets of special 
rules which purport to displace it the proper subject of a general dec-
laration of policy. The matter turns on the entire situation and the 
entire purpose of the Act. All but a few of the individual sections and 
sub-sections are subject as of course to be displaced one by one, by 
specific bargain; the question here goes to the displacement of the 
whole balanced background of all specific bargain, and the substitu-
tion therefor of another whole background. Only a declaration of pol-
icy can make reasonably clear what kind of substitution of 
background the Act seeks to encourage, and what kind it seeks to 
discourage. 
(2) Question for the court. The total estimate of the effect of a 
body of provisions, in terms of balance, is a job for which a court is 
peculiarly fitted. The question of whether the provisions fit the cir-
cumstances of a particular trade is one which a special merchants' 
jury can best judge, under Section 51-C. But the merchant runs some 
risk of accepting a provision merely as it is written because it is so 
written; and he has little training in sizing up a transaction from both 
ends at once, to reach a view of balance. As against this stands the 
fact that the issue to be tried is the issue of balance; and given that 
focus of attention, the merchants' jury would seem an adequate 
tribunal. 
But many cases, under the section, would be wholly for the court; 
notably purchases by consumers of articles commonly bought on 
complex forms. And if the policy of the section be approved, it may 
need explicit extension to cover contracts companioning the sales con-
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tract, as in the case of the sometimes startling purchase-money 
mortgages. 
(3) Constitutionality. There are a number of reasons for feeling 
that no constitutional questions are involved in this section. 
(a) Severe legislative restriction on minimum terms of 
particular types of transaction, where abuses have appeared, 
are familiar, and constitutional. Standard insurance policies 
are one instance; the Wisconsin statute on warranty and 
remedy in sales of farm machinery is another. 
(b) The section is built in terms of testing the reality of 
consent, not in terms of limiting freedom of contract. Real-
ity of consent has always been subject to testing by appropri-
ate legal measures. The measures of the section are 
appropriate and reasonable, fit the facts of life, and show 
their theory on their face. 
(c) The section builds a way through a confusion of 
case-law which itself leaves little doubt that Courts would 
welcome a clue to combining certainty and justice in these 
cases. Legislation felt by courts to be helpful in the work of 
the courts is very rarely held unconstitutional. 
